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Citizen-Friendly Approaches to Environmental Governance
by David L. Markell
Editors’ Summary: Numerous commentators have urged that government in-
crease opportunities for citizen participation as a way to advance a variety of
public policy goals (enhancing government legitimacy, promoting more in-
formed government decisions, etc.). In this Article, David L. Markell explores
the experience of an international decisionmaking process that relies heavily
on citizen participation, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s
(CEC) citizen submissions process, through the lens of the procedural justice
literature, which seeks to understand the reasons why citizens are satisfied with
decisionmaking processes. He offers some thoughts about the design and oper-
ation of the CEC process in terms of its effectiveness in promoting citizen par-
ticipation and also considers more generally the design of government pro-
cesses intended to engage citizens and to promote meaningful public participa-
tion in governance.
I. Introduction
Agency officials in the contemporary administrative state
have enormous power to carry out the work of government.1
While the president,2 the U.S. Congress,3 and the judiciary4
each has some capacity to serve as an institutional check on
the actions of agency officials,5 despite these checks,
agency staff have “nearly unfettered discretion” in carrying
out their responsibilities.6
The enormous power that unelected agency officials
wield, with limited oversight, has spawned an extensive lit-
erature concerning the legitimacy of the administrative
state.7 Indeed, Prof. Jody Freeman has suggested that
David Markell is the Steven M. Goldstein Professor at Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law.
[Editors’ Note: This Article is an updated and edited version of longer
treatments of this topic the author has previously published, particularly
Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making
Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36Envtl L. 651
(2006) [hereinafter Understanding Citizen Perspectives]. The citations for
this previous work, which is cited with permission, include Governance of
International Institutions: A Review of the North American Commission
for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submissions, 30 N.C. J. Int’l
L. & Com. Reg. 759 (2005) [hereinafter Governance of International In-
stitutions]; The CEC Citizen Submissions Process: On or Off Course, in
Greening NAFTA: The North American Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation 256 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds.,
2003) [hereinafter Greening NAFTA]; and The Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission Process, 12 Geo. Int’l
Envtl. L. Rev. 545 (2000).]
1. See, e.g., Dara K. Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Secu-
rity and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev.
673, 674 (2007) (noting that “[m]odern governments implement
most legal mandates through bureaucracies”); Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103Mich.
L. Rev. 2073, 2094 (2005) (indicating that administrative agencies
“constitute the basic, operational structure of modern government”);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureau-
cratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1512 (1992) (noting that
“[o]ver the past century, the powers and responsibilities of adminis-
trative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy”).
2. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 2245 (2001) (discussing the relationship between the executive
branch and the administrative state).
3. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Con-
stitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 125, 150-60 (reviewing mechanisms for legislative oversight
of agencies); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43
SanDiegoL.Rev. 61 (2006) (discussing the role of Congress in the
administrative state).
4. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Dele-
gated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies
and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035, 1069 (2006); Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
Minn. L. Rev. 689 (1990) (discussing judicial review of adminis-
trative decisionmaking).
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments
on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 783-90 (1999)
(outlining ways in which agencies are held democratically account-
able); Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 700 (discussing “internalist” and
“externalist” perspectives on bureaucratic performance).
6. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82
NotreDameL.Rev. 227 (2006) (discussing administrative discre-
tion); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72NotreDameL.
Rev. 157, 157-68 (1996) (addressing the reviewability of adminis-
trative decisions); Levin, supra note 4, at 693-702).
7. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1512; Cary Coglianese, Weak Democ-
racy, Strong Information: The Role of Information Technology in the
Rulemaking Process, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=961641 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2007). For a discussion of institutional legitimacy,
see, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S.
ELR
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“[a]dministrative law scholarship has organized itself
largely around the need to defend the administrative state
against accusations of illegitimacy.”8 These accusations
have focused on a variety of purported flaws, including
unaccountability of agency officials,9 a lack of transpar-
ency in the operation of the state,10 limited opportunities
for public participation,11 and dissatisfaction with agen-
cy performance.12
There has been strong support for increasing citizens’op-
portunities to participate in governance as a way to increase
government legitimacy and to address some of these per-
ceived flaws in the operation of the administrative state.
Prof. Jim Rossi, for example, suggests that “[o]ver the last
thirty years or so, courts, Congress, and scholars have ele-
vated participation to a sacrosanct status.”13 He notes that
“recent reform efforts are consistently geared to enhance
broad-based participation in the agency decisionmaking
process.”14 Proponents suggest that greater opportunities
for public involvement in agency decisionmaking processes
may help to enhance accountability and transparency in
governance, contribute to more informed, and thereby im-
proved, results,15 and foster a greater degree of connection
between the governed and the governing (and a blurring of
the line between the two) that leads to greater social capital
and societal trust.16
This Article explores ways in which the “procedural jus-
tice” literature on citizen satisfaction may shed some light
on the options for structuring government decisionmaking
processes intended to encourage citizen involvement.17
Parts II and III of the Article ground this effort to explore the
possible value of the procedural justice literature through a
case study of a process that is intended to encourage citizen
participation, and indeed depends on it, the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation’s (CEC) citizen submissions
process. This process, which empowers citizens to file com-
plaints in which they claim that any of the North American
countries is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its
environmental laws, was created with the hope that it would
enhance domestic environmental enforcement by increas-
ing government accountability and transparency, and in-
forming the exercise of agency discretion. Part II provides
an overview of the CEC, including a brief history, a sum-
mary of the purposes of the CEC citizen submissions pro-
cess, and an overview of the actual operation of the process.
Part III reviews the track record of the CEC citizen submis-
sions process and suggests that a potentially important facet
of this track record is that citizens’ use of the process in the
United States has slowed dramatically in recent years.
Part IV reviews the procedural justice literature on citizen
satisfaction with decisionmaking processes. A central in-
sight from this literature is that citizens value the processes
used to make decisions, as well as outcomes. In other words,
this literature suggests that citizens’assessments of the fair-
ness of third-party decisionmaking procedures are impor-
tant to judgments about the legitimacy of such processes, in-
dependent of the outcomes of such procedures. This part re-
views various factors the procedural justice literature identi-
NEWS & ANALYSIS5-2007 37 ELR 10363
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted, or Other-
wise?, 33 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 535 (2003).
8. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 543, 546 (2000).
9. See Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Ac-
countability in Modern Democracies 36 (2003) (discussing
government accountability). See generally Robert D. Behn, Re-
thinking Democratic Accountability (2001) (discussing the
evolution of accountability in various forms of government).
10. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Admin-
istrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1998) (referring to the
“administrative process” as the “proverbial black box that mysteri-
ously translates legislative inputs into regulatory outcomes”).
11. See id. at 97 (discussing how the administrative state does not “en-
courage widespread participation”).
12. Commentators have raised an enormous array of other concerns
about the administrative state such as “capture” of the regulatory
process, among others. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L.
Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 167, 169 (1990)
(discussing capture theory).
13. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participa-
tion for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.
173, 174-75 (1997). The same trend toward increased citizen in-
volvement exists at the international level. For example, in the en-
vironmental arena the 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 10 pro-
vides that “[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the partici-
pation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level” and that
“[s]tates shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and partic-
ipation by making information widely available . . . .” Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development, princ. 10, June 14, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 874.
14. Rossi, supra note 13, at 175. While interest in public participation
may be on the rise, commitment to open government and active civic
engagement in governance has deep roots in the United States. See,
e.g.,StephenBreyer,ActiveLiberty: InterpretingOurDem-
ocratic Constitution 3 (2005).
The United States is a nation built upon principles of liberty.
That liberty means not only freedom from government coer-
cion but also the freedom to participate in the government it-
self. [Jefferson, Adams, and the Founders] invoked an idea of
freedom as old as antiquity, the freedom of the individual citi-
zen to participate in the government and thereby to share with
others the right to make or to control the nation’s public acts.
Id.
15. Stephen Macedo et al., Democracy at Risk: How Political
Choices Undermine Citizen Participation and What We
Can Do About It 4 (2005); The Access Initiative—United
States, at the Frontlines ofDemocracy: Strengthening the
PublicVoice in StateEnvironmentalAffairs 1 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.accessinitiative.org/pdf/TAIUS_final.pdf (char-
acterizing including the public in decisionmaking as a “core princi-
ple of democracy”).
16. The question of how institutions build legitimacy is a difficult one
that remains largely “unanswered.” Gibson et al., supra note 7, at
556 (concluding, in a study of the U.S. Supreme Court, that
“[u]nderstanding how institutions acquire and spend legitimacy re-
mains one of the most important unanswered questions for those in-
terested in the power and influence of judicial institutions”). Societal
trust in government is reported to have dropped significantly in re-
cent years. See, e.g., What Is It About Government That
AmericansDislike? (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse,
eds., 2001) [hereinafter What Is It About Government];
Macedo et al., supra note 15, at 4 (arguing that “improving our in-
stitutions to promote robust citizen engagement is essential to Amer-
ican democracy”).
17. For a definition of procedural justice, see infra note 107 and Part IV.
This Article does not suggest that any particular level of citizen par-
ticipation is appropriate. There is a vast literature on the benefits and
costs of citizen engagement in governance. See, e.g., Rossi, supra
note 13, at 182-88 (summarizing the common justifications for
“mass participation” in agency decisionmaking); Steve Charnovitz,
Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gover-
nance, 18Mich. J. Int’l L. 183, 274-75 (1997) (listing 10 potential
benefits—and 3 commonly raised concerns—of empowering
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to participate in gover-
nance). Obviously, as discussed in more detail below, a wide variety
of factors others than citizen satisfaction with decisionmaking pro-
cesses may affect levels of citizen participation. See, e.g., infra notes
18, 104, and 131.
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fies as relevant to citizens’perspectives concerning the fair-
ness of particular processes.18
Part V contains an assessment of the CEC citizen submis-
sions process in the context of the procedural justice litera-
ture. My tentative conclusion is that the track record of the
process and the anecdotal feedback about it provides some
support for the procedural justice thesis, notably that fea-
tures of the process (such as its neutrality and the extent to
which citizens have trust in it) are influencing citizens’ in-
terest in using it (that is, citizens’assessments of the process
and its utility are apparently shaped by the process itself as
well as the outcomes it produces).19 Systematic follow-up
work is needed to confirm or rebut this sense of the com-
mentary, and to develop a more sophisticated appreciation
of the features of the citizen submissions process that are of
greatest importance in encouraging or deterring citizens’
participation.20 I also suggest the value more generally of
undertaking systematic analysis of decisionmaking pro-
cesses as part of the policymaking enterprise.
II. An Overview of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation and Its Citizen Submissions Process
21
A. An Overview of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) En-
vironmental Side Agreement, the North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),22 emerged
from the NAFTAnegotiations among the three North Amer-
ican countries, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, to
liberalize trade throughout the continent.23 The NAAEC
created a new international institution, the CEC, which has
been termed a “brave experiment in institution-building.”24
Among other things, the CEC: (1) is the “first of its kind in
the world in linking environmental cooperation with trade
relations”25; (2) has “innovative tools and almost unlimited
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18. Use of the procedural justice literature needs to be qualified, for a va-
riety of reasons. First, as is discussed infra Part IV, this literature is
by no means fully developed or mature. Second, another part of the
“justice” literature, which I leave for another day, considers how dif-
ferent outcomes of decisionmaking processes affect the level of citi-
zen satisfaction (the issue of “distributive justice”). Third, a range of
social scientists are interested in this issue of citizen satisfaction,
from a variety of perspectives. See generally What Is It About
Government, supra note 16; James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme
Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-In-
flicted or Otherwise?, 33Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 535, 539-45, 553 (2003)
(discussing the possible relevance of factors such as “institutional
loyalty” and “legitimizing symbols”). These perspectives deserve
consideration as part of any effort to enhance the legitimacy of gov-
ernment decisionmaking processes. Finally, a variety of factors may
have more effect than “procedural justice” in determining levels of
citizen participation (such as citizen expertise and resources, among
others). See infra Part IV.
19. Enhanced understanding of citizen preferences is only one step in the
effort to enhance governance. I am not suggesting that citizen prefer-
ences should control, or carry any particular amount of weight, in the
design of governance institutions. The question of how much of a
role citizens should play—how citizens’ perspectives and prefer-
ences should be balanced against other concerns—is for another
time. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolu-
tion: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 14-15 (1990) (dis-
cussing James Madison’s concerns about the “usurpation of govern-
ment power by well-organized groups with interests adverse to those
of the public as a whole”). In recent years, as NGOs have gained
entrée into previously closed arenas, several commentators have
identified a variety of issues that are relevant in considering this is-
sue, including the issue of NGO accountability. Ann Florini, for ex-
ample, has noted that many NGOs do not act in the broader “public
interest” and, moreover, effectively are unaccountable to society:
[T]here is nothing inherent in the nature of civil society that
ensures representation of a broad public interest. The neo-
Nazi hate groups that exchange repugnant rhetoric over the
Internet are just as much transnational civil society networks
as are the human rights coalitions. . . . [C]ivil society can seem
disruptive, narrow-minded, and above all unaccountable.
Ann M. Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of Transna-
tional Civil Society 231-32 (2000). Florini notes that “to date,
most NGOs have remained relatively immune to the growing pres-
sure for transparency on the part of governments and the private sec-
tor. . . . [T]o leave the issue unaddressed is to threaten the long-term
legitimacy of an important contributor to global governance.” Id. at
233. Paul Posner identifies five generic problems that relate to ac-
countability challenges with third party tools, including goal diver-
sion. Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Gov-
ernment, in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New
Governance 523, 528-32 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). Prof.
Ariel Armony explores the “dark side” of civil society, and its poten-
tial to undermine democracy. See Ariel C. Armony, The Dubi-
ous Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization 4 (2004).
Armony argues, inter alia, that
[c]ivil society does not necessarily promote the public inter-
est or reforms that are beneficial for the majority. . . . Smaller
groups of participants with ample resources and privileged
access to decisionmaking spheres can impose narrow and pa-
rochial interests on the public agenda and, as a result, impose
unreasonable burdens on the broader society.
Id.
20. I am currently working with New York University psychology pro-
fessor Tom R. Tyler on a follow-up project involving several pro-
cesses that are intended to encourage citizen participation. To review
the survey, see http://www.createsurvey.com/c/36009-zac1ZV/.
21. I have previously written about the CEC and its citizen submissions
process, and some of the discussion in this section is taken from that
earlier work. See Editors’ Note at the beginning of these notes.
22. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., arts. 8-19, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [here-
inafter NAAEC].
23. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA]. For book-length treat-
ments of the CEC, including discussion of its origins, see, e.g., Pi-
erre-Marc Johnson & André Beaulieu, The Environment
and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New
Continental Law (1996); Greening NAFTA, supra note 21.
For analyses the CEC itself developed or commissioned, see, e.g.,
Ten-YearReview&AssessmentComm., TenYears ofNorth
American Environmental Cooperation (2004), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/PUBLICATIONS/TRAC-Report2004_
en.pdf [hereinafter TRAC]; Environmental Law Inst., Final
Report: Issues Relating toArticles 14 and 15 of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(2003), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/ELI-
Art14-15-Report-Final-5_en.pdf [hereinafter Issues Relating];
Joint Pub. Advisory Comm. (JPAC), Lessons Learned: Citi-
zen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Fi-
nal Report to the Council of the Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation (2001), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/JPAC/rep11-e-final_EN.PDF [hereinafter Lessons
Learned]; Independent Review Comm., Four-Year Review
of North American Agreement on Environmental Cooper-
ation: Report of the Independent ReviewCommittee (1998),
available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_
agree/cfp3.cfm?varlan=english [hereinafterFour-YearReview].
24. TRAC, supra note 23, at 4.
25. Id. at ix.
26. Greening NAFTA, supra note 21, at 2.
27. TRAC, supra note 23, at ix.
28. Greening NAFTA, supra note 21, at 2.
29. NAAEC, supra note 22, art 8-19. See John D. Wirth, Perspectives on
the Joint Public Advisory Committee, inGreeningNAFTA, supra
note 21, at 199 (highlighting the broad mandate and substantial
achievements of the JPAC).
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jurisdiction”26 to address “almost any environmental issue
anywhere in North America”27; and (3) “provides unprece-
dented opportunities for participation by civil society at the
international level.”28
The CEC has three players: (1) a Council, comprised of
the environmental ministers of the three Parties; (2) a Secre-
tariat, essentially the Commission’s staff, located primarily
in Montreal; and (3) an innovative independent advisory
committee made up of five citizens from each of the coun-
tries, known as the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC).29 With the important exception of the citizen sub-
missions process, described below,30 the Council is respon-
sible for setting the agenda for the Commission.31 The
Council approves the annual work plan for the Commission
and oversees the work done to implement the work plan.32
The Secretariat develops the draft work plan for Council
approval33 and takes the lead on implementation of the work
plan.34 The JPAC is unique in making representatives of
civil society part of the governance structure of the CEC; it
puts them on the inside.35 The JPAC is authorized to provide
advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of the
Agreement and takes an active role in soliciting input on key
issues from interested North American stakeholders.36
The CEC’s reach, and potential importance, transcends
its NAFTA roots and trade/environment origins. As John
Knox and I have suggested elsewhere, it represents an ex-
periment in regional environmental governance and should
be of considerable interest to those interested in cooperative
efforts on environmental issues:
[T]he NAAEC and the CEC are much more than window
dressing for NAFTA. The NAAEC establishes the first
regional environmental organization in North America
and gives it interesting, innovative mandates; it ad-
dresses environmental issues related to economic inte-
gration in more detail than any other agreement outside
the European Union; and it provides new opportunities
for direct public participation in its implementation. In
all of these respects, the NAAEC offers lessons for other
countries seeking to address shared environmental prob-
lems against a backdrop of increasing economic integra-
tion—which is to say, all countries.37
Moreover, given the increasing emphasis on “spotlight-
ing” instruments,38 citizen participation in governance,39
and accountability mechanisms (and government perfor-
mance),40 the particular part of the CEC that is the focus of
this Article, its citizen submissions process, deserves partic-
ular attention because it is an example of a spotlighting
mechanism intended to facilitate such participation and ac-
countability (and improved performance).41 The following
section describes this innovative citizen submissions pro-
cess in more detail.
B. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Citizen Submissions Process
The CEC citizen submissions process has been touted as a
possible model for enhancing public oversight of govern-
ment enforcement efforts. As the CEC’s JPAC put it:
In preparing this Report, we have been conscious of the
importance of the Articles 14 and 15 submission process
as a vehicle for public oversight of the enforcement of
environmental laws by the Parties to the [NAFTA] and
as a possible model for similar efforts under other trade
agreements within the Americas and the world.42
A variety of commentators have echoed this sentiment. As
one commentator has suggested, “[t]he Citizen’s Submis-
sion Process [is] perhaps the most important function of the
Secretariat of the CEC, and definitely the one that has cap-
tured the most attention of environmental groups, the pri-
vate sector, and legal specialists . . . .”43 Chris Wold, the prin-
cipal author of the one U.S. submission to result in a CEC
NEWS & ANALYSIS5-2007 37 ELR 10365
30. See infra Part II.
31. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 10(1). The Secretariat also has some dis-
cretion under Article 13 of the NAAEC. Id. art. 13. For an assess-
ment of one Secretariat Article 13 report, see Dan Tarlock & John E.
Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro River
Basin, in Greening NAFTA, supra note 21, at 217-36.
32. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 10(1).
33. Id. art. 11(6).
34. See id. art. 11 (describing the Secretariat’s structure and procedures
for carrying out its technical, administrative, and operational sup-
port duties).
35. See id. art. 16; Janine Feretti, Innovations in Managing Globaliza-
tion: Lessons From the North American Experience, 15 Geo. Int’l
Envtl. L. Rev. 367, 370 (2003) (discussing the JPAC’s creation as
signaling the Parties’ “commitment to public participation” and as
an example of the Parties’ building the public’s role “into the struc-
ture of the Commission . . .”).
36. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 16(4); See Joint Pub. Advisory
Comm., North Am. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, As-
suringPublic Participation 1 (2003), available at http://www.
cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/FactSheet_EN%20fin.pdf (“Since 1994,
the Committee has made several calls for public comment on spe-
cific topics and has made important advice to Council and Secretar-
iat, contributing to the CEC’s work.”).
37. John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, in Greening
NAFTA, supra note 21, at 9, 13.
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147U.Pa.L.Rev. 613, 618-26 (1999)
(discussing “informational regulation,” that is, regulation intended
to promote effective implementation through relatively “soft,”
noncoercive approaches, rather than through conventional “com-
mand-and-control” strategies). See generally Clifford Recht-
schaffen & David L. Markell, Reinventing Environmental
Enforcement and The State/Federal Relationship 59-83,
213-67 (2003) (discussing different strategies for promoting envi-
ronmental compliance).
39. See supra note 13.
40. See, e.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its
Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84Or.L.
Rev. 1 (2005).
41. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at 4.
42. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 2. ELI has characterized the
process as “[b]y far the most innovative and substantial mechanism
created within the NAAEC for fostering transparency and public
participation.” Issues Relating, supra note 23, at 4; TRAC, supra
note 23, at 42, 43 (“One of the key mechanisms the NAAEC created
to meets its objective of enhancing compliance with, and enforce-
ment of, environmental laws and regulations is the citizen submis-
sion process . . . . This mechanism is the NAAEC’s most innovative
and most controversial.”). The TRAC Report also quotes a JPAC Ad-
visor that the process plays a “unique and indispensable role in fos-
tering vigorous environmental enforcement.” Id.
43. Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up to Its Green Expectations? Effective
Law Enforcement Under the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, 32U.Rich.L.Rev. 1591, 1596 (1999).
44. Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process
of Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation, 26Loy. L.A. Int’l &Comp. L. Rev. 415, 416
(2004).
45. Id. Wold also noted that “[c]itizens had strongly supported the Citi-
zen Submission Process and played an active role in supporting and
employing the mechanism . . . .” Id. at 416; see also Randy
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factual record,44 notes that “[m]any had regarded the Citizen
Submission Process as a potential model for accountability
and governance for a new breed of international institu-
tions—a positive response to globalization that gives citi-
zens a voice in the often impenetrable affairs of interna-
tional organizations.”45
In short, the process was intended to be an important fea-
ture of the countries’ efforts to bolster domestic governance
capacity in response to concerns that the liberalized trade
made possible by NAFTA would increase pressures on do-
mestic governments because of “race to the bottom,” scale,
and other possible effects.46 The hope was that this citizen
spotlighting mechanism would empower citizens and invig-
orate the domestic environmental enforcement practices of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, which would lead
to improved compliance and higher levels of environmen-
tal protection.47
There are three main actors in the citizen submissions
process: the CEC Council48; interested citizens (“civil soci-
ety”)49; and a Secretariat.50 In creating the process, the par-
ties assigned a substantial role to citizens of the three North
American countries. The NAAEC empowers citizens to
start the spotlighting process and, thereby, influence where
the spotlight will shine (the process is launched with the fil-
ing of a citizen complaint, called a submission).51 In addi-
tion, the NAAEC empowers citizens to contribute informa-
tion about the nature and effectiveness of the government
enforcement practices at issue in particular submissions.52
The NAAEC vests in the CEC Secretariat considerable
authority over administration of the process.53 Under the
NAAEC’s division of responsibilities, it is the Secretariat’s
job to conduct the initial review of a submission and decide,
based on a variety of factors contained in NAAEC Article
14(1) and (2), whether to reject the submission or to ask the
targeted country for a response.54 Article 14(2)(b), for ex-
ample, directs the Secretariat to consider whether the sub-
mission “raises matters whose further study in [the citizen
submissions] process would advance the goals of this
Agreement.”55 If the Secretariat determines that a submis-
sion does not warrant further review, based on the Secretar-
iat’s consideration of the submission in light of the Article
14(1) and (2) factors, the Secretariat may unilaterally dis-
miss the submission.56
For submissions that survive the Secretariat’s Article
14(1) and (2) filtering process, it is the Secretariat’s respon-
sibility both to request a response from the Party whose en-
forcement efforts are the focus of the submission, and to re-
view the submission in light of any such response.57 The
Secretariat then determines whether to notify the Council
that, in the Secretariat’s view, it would be appropriate under
the NAAEC to prepare a “factual record.”58 The Secretariat
may unilaterally dismiss a submission at this stage if it de-
termines that a factual record is not warranted.59 In either
case—a recommendation to proceed with a factual record or
a dismissal—the Secretariat must explain the rationale for
its decision.60
If the Council directs the Secretariat to go forward with
the development of a factual record, the Secretariat has the
opportunity and responsibility to develop information relat-
ing to the allegations in the submission of a failure to effec-
tively enforce and then to prepare a draft factual record that
contains the results of its investigative work. Article 15(4)
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Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA: Ob-
servations After 10 Years, 14 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 165 (2004) (not-
ing that the citizen submission process has been an effective means
of “highlighting environmental problems, compelling governments
to engage in debates, and bringing about positive environmental
change through independent factual investigations”). Significant el-
ements of the environmental community continued to oppose
NAFTA despite the commitment to create the NAAEC and establish
the CEC. See, e.g., Mary E. Kelly, NAFTA’s Environmental Side
Agreement: A Review and Analysis, pt. 2 (Tex. Ctr. for Pol’y Stud.,
Austin, Tex. 1993), available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-
099/008-099ii.html (suggesting that “the non-binding, virtually
advisory role of most CEC reports and recommendations [under-
mine] the value of having such a broad scope of issues come under
the CEC”).
46. See Greg M. Block, The North American Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation and the Environmental Effects of NAFTA: A
Decade of Lessons Learned and Where They Leave Us, 26 Loy.
L.A. Int’l &Comp. L. Rev. 445, 451 (2004) (examining the effects
of trade liberalization on environmental expenditures); Kal
Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 389, 395 (2004) (noting that “[m]any
environmentalists believe that trade liberalization undermines envi-
ronmental protection not only in terms of a race to the bottom in reg-
ulatory standards, but also in a race-to-the-bottom in implementation
and enforcement”).
47. David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, Envtl. F.,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 33; see John H. Knox, A New Approach to Com-
pliance With International Environmental Law: The Submissions
Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28Ecology
L.Q. 1, 23 (2001). In its June 1998 report, the Independent Review
Committee (IRC) suggests that the process “feed[s] into the Coun-
cil’s responsibility to promote high environmental standards and
their enforcement, and to prevent a race to the bottom from occur-
ring.” Four-Year Review, supra note 23, at 8. In the IRC’s view,
the process provides “some 350 million pairs of eyes to alert the
Council of any ‘race to the bottom’ through lax environmental en-
forcement.” Id. at 17.
48. NAAEC, supra note 22, arts. 8-19.
49. Id.
50. Id. arts. 11-15. The JPAC has also played in important role in the citi-
zen submissions process. See Wirth, supra note 29, at 199 (discuss-
ing the JPAC’s role in the CEC).
51. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14.
52. Id. art. 15.
53. The TRAC Report characterizes the Secretariat as “unique among in-
tergovernmental organizations in the combination of its traditional
service role to the governments that created it with responsibilities
where the Secretariat has certain autonomy (Articles 13 to 15. . . .).”
TRAC, supra note 23, at 32. A former CEC Executive Director has
stated that there is a “significant natural tension between the Secre-
tariat and the Parties” because of the independent authority of the
Secretariat. Feretti, supra note 35, at 369.
54. Id. art. 14.
55. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
56. Id.
57. NAAEC, supra note 22, arts. 14(2), 15(1).
58. Id. art. 15(1). Factual records are the endpoint of the citizen submis-
sion process and provide information about the nature of the Party’s
enforcement practices at issue and about the effectiveness of those
enforcement practices.
59. Id. Council Res. 99-06, at 9.6, C.E.C. Doc. C/99-00/RES/07/
Rev.3 (June 28, 1999), available at http://www.cec.org/citizen/
guide_submit/index.cfm?varlan=english [hereinafter Guidelines
for Submissions].
60. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(1) (recommendation to proceed with
a factual record); Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 59, at 9.6.
61. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(4).
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 21.
64. Id. art. 11(4).
65. Id. art. 15.
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of the Agreement authorizes the Secretariat to consider “any
relevant technical, scientific or other information” that is:
(1) “publicly available”; (2) “submitted by interested
non-governmental organizations or persons”; (3) submitted
by the JPAC; or (4) “developed by the Secretariat or by inde-
pendent experts.”61 The Agreement also specifies that the
Secretariat shall consider any information provided by a
Party.62 Another provision in the NAAEC, Article 21, gives
the Secretariat authority to obtain information from the
Parties,63 and Article 11(4) forbids unilateral Party efforts to
influence the Secretariat in the performance of its responsi-
bilities.64 Thus, the Agreement appears to give the Secretar-
iat broad discretion to obtain information about the enforce-
ment practices that are the focus of each submission, includ-
ing hiring experts to assist it and requesting information
from the country involved.
Finally, after developing a draft factual record and sub-
mitting it to the Council for comments,65 the Secretariat has
discretion to develop a final factual record, incorporating
any Party comments only to the extent the Secretariat
deems appropriate.66
While the NAAEC gives considerable authority to citizen
submitters (including the power to trigger the process and
thereby to determine on what enforcement practices the
spotlighting mechanism will shine), and to the Secretariat
to administer the process, it is also clear that, in creating the
CEC, the parties vested considerable power in the Council,
reflecting their intention to retain an important role in the
implementation of the citizen submissions process.67 As
suggested above, the process creates specific “checks” that
the Council may exercise at particular stages in the citizen
submissions process. Thus, the NAAEC gives the Council
a “check” on submissions for which the Secretariat be-
lieves development of a factual record is warranted. In-
stead of allowing the Secretariat unilaterally to determine
to proceed with the preparation of a factual record, the
parties reserve in the Council authority to terminate a sub-
mission at this stage.68 The NAAEC requires that the Sec-
retariat recommend preparation of a factual record to the
Council and it empowers the Council to decide, after it re-
views the Secretariat’s Recommendation, whether to dis-
miss the submission or direct the Secretariat to prepare a
factual record.69
The process creates two additional Party “checks” on the
Secretariat’s authority, both following the Secretariat’s
preparation of a draft factual record. First, the NAAEC re-
quires that the Secretariat submit draft factual records to the
Council, and it authorizes each Party to provide comments
to the Secretariat on the draft (important limitations on these
Party “checks” are that parties’ comments must be confined
to the “accuracy” of the draft, and the Secretariat need only
take such comments into account, when the Secretariat
deems appropriate, but it is not obligated to incorporate
them).70 The Parties’ other check is that the Council retains
control over public release of final factual records.71 The
Secretariat must submit each final factual record to the
Council, and it is up to the Council to determine whether to
release it to the public.72
III. The Track Record of Citizens’ Use of the Citizen
Submissions Process
As noted above, citizens initiate the citizen submissions
process by filing a submission in which they allege that a
Party is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its envi-
ronmental laws.73 This is potentially an important, indeed
unique, opportunity for citizens to direct a spotlight onto
government enforcement practices that citizens believe are
inadequate.74 The track record of citizens’use of the process
is likely to be a helpful signal of the process’ prospects for
success. Infrequent, and declining, use would seemingly
raise a “red flag” about citizen perceptions about the value
of the process, while frequent, and increasing, use would be
a promising sign concerning its utility, actual and per-
ceived.75 As the following brief overview of the track record
of citizen use of the process reflects, while citizen use has
been relatively stable overall, citizen use of the process to
challenge the effectiveness of U.S. environmental enforce-
ment has declined precipitously in recent years.
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66. Id. art. 15(5)-(6).
67. See Markell, Governance of International Institutions, supra note
21, at 769-80.
68. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(2). (“The Secretariat shall prepare a
factual record if the Council, by a two-thirds vote, instructs it to do
so.”) (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 15(5)-15(6).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14.
74. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 2.
75. There are other signals or indicators of success or failure as well.
Some are intrinsic to the process, such as the significance of the prac-
tices that are spotlighted. Further, extrinsic factors may be relevant
to the effectiveness of the process, such as the need for the mecha-
nism in light of the alternatives, the level of concern about govern-
ment enforcement, Environmental NGO resources, other priorities,
and the like. See infra Part IV. In addition, processes may be effec-
tive—in the sense that they may help to build societal trust—with
respect to nonparticipants who nevertheless approve of and/or ben-
efit from the processes being used. Greg Block wrote in a 2003 arti-
cle that
[a] number of Mexican nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and policy analysts attest to the positive impact the
CEC has made on transparency in governmental
decisionmaking and access to information, as well as certain
aspects of domestic environmental policy. The CEC’s access
to information policies, decisionmaking records, citizen sub-
mission process, and public Council sessions have helped
shape Mexican citizens’ expectations for the conduct of gov-
ernment business for national agencies and public institu-
tions. That the Mexican Environmental Ministry is regarded
as one of the more open and transparent Mexican government
agencies is in a small, but not inconsequential way, due to its
intense interaction with the CEC and civil society.
Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere:
Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration Into the Americas, 33 Envtl. L. 501, 516 (2003); see also
Yang, infra note 151, at 443. Professor Yang notes that there are sev-
eral points in the citizen submissions process that have the potential
to produce information that otherwise might not see the light of day
and, once made public, lead to improvements in domestic environ-
mental enforcement practices. Id.
76. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 13-14.
77. Id. at 10, 13 (noting that the Secretariat needs additional resources to
administer the process because of the workload).
78. See Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the
NAAEC, inGreeningNAFTA, supra note 21, at 256, 257; TRAC,
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A. Overall Use of the Process
In its 2001 report, Lessons Learned: Citizens Submissions
Under Articles 14 and 15, the JPAC puts a positive gloss
on the extent of citizens’ use of the citizen submissions
process.76 It notes that “[c]itizen [s]ubmissions [p]lay
an [e]ssential [r]ole in [a]chieving the [g]oals of the
NAAEC. . . . NGOs from the NAAEC countries have re-
peatedly turned to the Articles 14 and 15 process when they
believed that domestic environmental remedies were not
adequate to address their complaints.”77 On the other hand,
some commentators have been less impressed with the level
of citizen use of the process.78
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive review of use of the
citizen submissions process. It shows that, as of December
31, 2006, citizens have filed a total of 58 submissions since
inception of the CEC in 1994.
Figure 1: Citizen Submissions Process: Annual Submissions (Through December 31, 2006)79
Submissions work out to 4.5 per year over this 13-year pe-
riod. If one were to start the clock from the beginning of
1995, the year in which the first submission was filed, the
average is 4.8 submissions per year (58 divided by 12).
Thus, regardless of whether one begins counting submis-
sions at the time the citizen submissions process was first
available for business, or whether one waits a year to give
the process a chance to become better known, the total of 58
submissions translates into between four or five submis-
sions per year.
The other feature of this record that seems to be poten-
tially relevant to use is the question of trends in use over
time. Has the process experienced a significant increase or
decrease in its use since its inception? Asignificant increase
seemingly would suggest a vital process that is perceived to
be useful. Asignificant decrease seemingly would portend a
process that is not perceived to have sufficient promise or
value to warrant use.
As Figure 1 reflects, here the record is not particularly
clear. During the first six years of the process, from
1994–1999, a total of 22 submissions were filed. During the
past seven years, a total of 36 submissions have been filed.
This track record suggests that the process is experiencing
an increase in use. One qualification, however, is that the
picture of a trend of increasing submissions is much less
clear if one discounts the start-up year (1994, when no sub-
missions were filed). That is, if one begins with 1995, a total
of 28 submissions were filed during the initial six-year pe-
riod (from 1995-2000), while 30 have been filed during the
more recent six-year period. As a result, the distribution of
submissions between the first and second six-year periods is
relatively equal. In short, viewed on its own, the track record
appears to reflect a pattern of relatively stable use, with
moderate ebbs and flows annually, rather than a significant
increase or decrease in use over time.
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supra note 23, at 43 (indicating that the CEC has “received far fewer
submissions than initially anticipated”).
79. Figure 1 was developed using data released by the Secretariat, as
well as the CEC website. See CEC, Article 14 Citizen Submis-
sions onEnforcementMatters: Process Status as of 27 Jan-
uary 2006 (2006) (on file with author). The Secretariat develops
these status updates periodically and makes them available to the
public. As a general matter, I am especially indebted to Damian
Zimmerman, J.D. expected 2007, Florida State University College
of Law, for his work in the development of the tables and figures in
this Article.
80. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 arts. 27-41 (1993) [hereinafter
NAALC].
81. NAFTA, supra note 23, ch. 11.
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In addition to reviewing the track record of the CEC pro-
cess on its own, it also may be helpful to evaluate this record
by comparing it with other citizen-driven mechanisms.
There are two citizen-driven processes under the suite of
NAFTA Agreements besides the CEC citizen submissions
process: the citizen submissions mechanism created under
the Labor Side Agreement,80 and the investor provision cre-
ated under NAFTA itself.81 These would seem to be natural
points of possible comparison for the CEC process, al-
though the processes are by no means identical and, indeed,
there are significant differences between them.
The Labor Side Agreement, like the NAAEC, allows
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to file petitions.
Under the NAALC, the petitions are filed with National Ad-
ministrative Offices (NAOs), bodies that are set up as agen-
cies within the labor department of each member state.82 In
other words, they are not independent of the member gov-
ernments. There have been a total of 36 submissions since
inception of the process in 1994, as Figure 2 reflects.
Figure 2: NAALC Labor Agreement Annual NAO Submissions (Through December 31, 2006)83
These figures suggest at least two salient facts in terms of the
Labor process’ relevance as a possible point of comparison
for the CEC citizen submissions process. First, the environ-
mental citizen submissions process has experienced much
more use than the Labor Agreement process: only 62% as
many submissions have been filed under the latter as under
the former. Further, the Labor Agreement statistics reflect a
significant decline in use over the past several years. During
the first six years of its operation, a total of 22 submissions
were filed, while only 14 have been filed during the past
seven years. Thus, more than 60% of the submissions were
filed during the first six years, and less than 40% over the
past seven years. In short, in terms of total use and trends in
use, the CEC process appears to be much more vibrant than
does the Labor Agreement process.84
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82. See NAALC, supra note 80, art. 15 (requiring each party to treaty to
establish National Administrative Office at the federal government
level); Jonathan Graubart, “Politicizing” a New Breed of “Legal-
ized” Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activ-
ists Uses of NAFTA’s Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 97, 99 (2005).
83. Figure 2 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department
of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, http://www.dol.
gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm# (last visited Mar. 6, 2007), as
updated via a March 6, 2007 e-mail from and telephone conversation
with John Mondejar, Information Officer in the Trade Agreement
Administration and Technical Cooperation Office of the Bureau of
International Labor Affairs of the U.S. Department of Labor (e-mail
on file with the author).
84. Another key point concerning the Labor process involves the spike
in use in 1998. During that year 10 submissions were filed, far more
than in any other year. Professor Graubart has suggested that “some
past petitioners [are] ready to write off the [NAALC] process alto-
gether.” Graubart, supra note 82, at 98. He suggests that “[s]hifts in
the broader political context affect the value” of mechanisms like the
NAALC, and that the reduction in perceived value of the NAALC
process is attributable to a less supportive U.S. Administration, and a
Mexican President who is less vulnerable to shaming campaigns. Id.
at 101. He concludes that a “deteriorating political climate guts the
political value of quasi-judicial, nonbinding mechanisms.” Id. at
121. Graubart suggests, however, that the process has “proven its po-
litical worth” through the changes it has engendered, and that the
NAALC is “likely to regain value when political circumstances turn
favorable again.” Id. at 101, 140.
Copyright © 2007 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA85 includes a variety of provisions
that are intended to protect foreign direct investment by
North American investors in other North American coun-
tries. It establishes that, for instance, government measures
should not discriminate between foreign and domestic
investors86; it is intended to assure a “minimum standard” of
“fair and equitable” treatment for foreign investors,87 and it
limits expropriation or any measure “tantamount to nation-
alization or expropriation.”88 Investors are empowered to
seek relief through binding international arbitration.89 In-
vestors have filed a total of 28 cases under Chapter 11 since
NAFTA entered into force in 1994, as Figure 3 reflects.
Figure 3: NAFTA Chapter 11: Annual Submissions (Through December 31, 2006)90
In terms of the possible salience of the NAFTA Chapter 11
experience for assessing the track record of the CEC citizen
submissions process, over the same period of time the CEC
process has received much more citizen use than has the
NAFTA Chapter 11 process. The latter has experienced
48%, or a little less than half as many submissions. The fig-
ure reflects that after the first three years (during which no
petitions were filed), use has been relatively stable.91
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85. NAFTA, supra note 23, at 639-49.
86. Id. at 639.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 640.
89. Id. at 643; see Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting
the Environment: The Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in
Greening NAFTA, supra note 21, at 174-77 (providing an over-
view of Chapter 11 of NAFTA).
90. Figure 3 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department
of State. U.S. Dep’t of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). My
thanks to Marin Dell, Florida State University Law Librarian, for her
help in researching this information. The data reflect the number of
NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes submitted for arbitra-
tion from 1994 through December 31, 2006. The Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. United Mexican States claim filed in 1998, first rejected
by a tribunal on procedural grounds and then later refiled, only
counts as one claim. Similarly, the more than 100 claims listed as
Cases Regarding the Border Closing Due to BSE Concerns are
treated as one claim.
91. Other citizen-driven mechanisms were created by international in-
stitutions at about the same time as the NAAEC citizen submissions
process was established. The World Bank’s inspection panel, cre-
ated in 1993, allows people directly and adversely affected by a pro-
posed bank project to claim that the World Bank failed to follow its
own operational policies and procedures during the design, ap-
praisal, and/or implementation of a World Bank-financed project.
Since 1993 the World Bank Inspection Panel has received a total of
34 requests. There has been a significant decline in submissions to
the Inspection Panel over the second half of its existence. While
there were 20 submissions during the first six years (from
1994-1999), there have only been 14 over the past six years
(2000-2005). See Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complaints and Inter-
national Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent
Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial Institutions, 36
Geo. J. Int’l L. 403, 411-20 (2005) (discussing the World Bank In-
spection Panel). Significant differences in the mechanisms may ac-
count for these differences in track record, such as their jurisdic-
tional scope, and standing to bring a claim. The World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel, Res. No. 93-10, World Bank (Sept. 22, 1993), reprinted
in World Bank Inspection Panel, Operating Procedures Annex 1
(1994). Several other international financial institutions have estab-
lished inspection mechanisms since the World Bank did so in 1993.
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What insights, if any, should we glean from the CEC’s
track record, when viewed independently, and relative to
other citizen-driven mechanisms created around the same
time? While comparative analysis of different institutions
with different structures, powers, and constituencies should
obviously be done with considerable caution,92 such an
analysis shows that use of the CEC process (between four
and five submissions per year) is not out of line with the
other NAFTA citizen-driven institutions. If anything, there
has been greater recourse to the CEC mechanism than to
the others.
Trends in use of the CEC mechanism are not particularly
clear. There has been an ebb and flow in use of the CEC pro-
cess, but there has not been a significant increase or decrease
in overall use, if one compares the early years of the process
and the more recent period. It is unclear, at this point, how
use of the CEC process will evolve over time, including
whether the CEC process is experiencing a long gestation
period before it takes off, or whether use will remain rela-
tively stable or decline in the future.93
B. A More Nuanced Review of the CEC Citizen
Submissions Process Track Record
A more detailed analysis of the track record of citizens’ use
of the CEC process tells a potentially different story than the
picture one might glean from the numbers reviewed in the
preceding section. In particular, a look at the number of sub-
missions disaggregated based on the country targeted re-
veals trends in use that suggest that citizens have not em-
braced the process as a viable mechanism for raising con-
cerns about U.S. enforcement; indeed, for the past few years
they seem to have virtually abandoned it for this purpose.
Table 1 provides a more detailed breakdown of citizen
submissions than Figure 1 above, by reviewing the distribu-
tion of submissions by country involved. It shows that, over-
all, of the 58 total submissions, 10 have involved the United
States, 19 have involved Canada, and 30 have involved
Mexico (a 2006 submission, 06-002, Devils Lake, targeted
both Canadian and U.S. enforcement practices and I have
included it for each country.)
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Bradlow, supra, at 409. Further, the European Union created the Eu-
ropean Ombudsman in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to investigate
complaints of maladministration in the European Union governing
bodies. Any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person resid-
ing or having its registered office in a member state can lodge a com-
plaint with the Ombudsman. Use of this process has been signifi-
cantly greater than use of any of the NAFTA-created processes, in-
cluding the CEC process and also significantly greater than use of
the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and use has increased dramati-
cally since inception of the process. See id. at 449-53 (discussing the
European Ombudsman). The citizen submissions process created in
the 1997 Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
provides another basis for comparison. This process has received
only four submissions to date, none since 2002. None of the submis-
sions resulted in a factual record. Canadian Nat’l Secretariat, Can-
ada-Chile Agreement on Envtl. Cooperation Submissions Registry,
http://www.can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry/Regis-
try.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
In addition, domestic mechanisms exist as well. In the United
States, for example, citizens have a broad range of potential mecha-
nisms for raising concerns about performance, including citizen
suits under statutory law against violators, citizen suits against gov-
ernment agencies for not performing nondiscretionary acts, common
law actions, and the opportunity to participate in various ways in
government enforcement and permitting actions. Professor Jim May
reports that the trend is toward more citizen suit activity, indicating
that since 1995, citizens have filed about one lawsuit each week and
submitted more than 4,500 notices of intent to sue, which translates
to about two notices of intent to sue every business day. James R.
May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits
at 30, 10WidenerL.Rev. 1, 4 (2003). Use of this domestic mecha-
nism obviously dwarfs use of the CEC process.
92. See John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agree-
ments on Labor and the Environment, 26 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp.
L. Rev. 359, 379 (2004).
93. In his review of the track records of the NAAEC and the NAALC
processes, Knox concludes that the CEC procedure is more effec-
tive, in part because citizens have continued to use it. He “urg[ed] la-
bor and environmental advocates to recognize the relative success of
the NAAEC and [to] work to build on its provisions.” Id. at 360.
94. Table 1 was developed using the data released by the Secretariat.
CEC, supra note 79.
95. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 47, at 23.
96. See, e.g., Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms, supra note 46,
at 412 (stating that “the disparity in citizen submissions probably
reflects the existence of better alternatives in U.S. domestic
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Table 1: Distribution of Submissions by Country (Through December 31, 2006)94
On the one hand, it is not necessarily surprising that Mex-
ico would be the target of more submissions than Canada or
the United States. The process originally was created in part
because of concerns about Mexican enforcement, so it is
consistent with that original conception for submissions to
disproportionately target Mexico.95 Thus, some might sug-
gest that the distribution of filings reflects that the process is
working as intended. There also may be good reasons for the
disparity beyond differences in the enforcement perfor-
mance of the respective governments. For example, signifi-
cant differences in the availability of domestic tools for citi-
zens to challenge government performance and/or to take
action on their own to address inadequate enforcement may
well be important factors underlying the disparity in sub-
missions across countries.96
On the other hand, the disparity is arguably significant
given the populations of each country—the United States,
which has by far the fewest submissions, has by far the larg-
est population, estimated at just over 300 million.97 In com-
parison, Canada’s estimated population is slightly more
than 33 million,98 and Mexico’s estimated population is ap-
proximately 107 million.99
The more significant finding concerning the track record
of citizen use of the citizen submissions process relates to
trends in use, rather than to the overall use of the process de-
picted above. In particular, there has been a significant
change in use of the process in recent years in terms of the
countries citizens are targeting. Table 2 reviews use of the
process during its first seven years, roughly the first half of
its existence. There were a total of 28 submissions during
this period, approximately half of the 58 filed to date. Table
2 shows that the distribution of submissions by country dur-
ing this initial seven year period is relatively uniform or bal-
anced. Of the 28 submissions, eight were filed against the
United States (29%), nine were filed against Canada (32%),
and 11 were filed against Mexico (39%).
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law”); Christensen, supra note 45, at 171 (stating that a “common
explanation given for the low usage of the citizen submission pro-
cess in the United States is the wide availability of domestic en-
forcement mechanisms”).
97. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Population Clock for Jan. 16, 2006, http://
factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007).
98. Cent. IntelligenceAgency, TheWorld Factbook, Canada,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2007) (reporting the most current Canadian census in-
formation).
99. Cent. IntelligenceAgency, TheWorldFactbook,Mexico,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mx.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (reporting the most current Mexican cen-
sus information).
100. Table 2 was developed using data released by the Secretariat.CEC,
supra note 79.
101. SEM-06-002 (Devils Lake Submission, filed Mar. 30, 2006).
102. Secretariat Determination (Aug. 21, 2006), available on the CEC
website.
103. Table 3 was developed using data released by the Secretariat.CEC,
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Table 2: Distribution of Submissions by Country 1994-2000 (Total Submissions 1994-2000)100
Table 3 shows that the distribution of submissions has
changed dramatically during the most recent six-year pe-
riod, from 2001-2006. Table 3 reflects that of the 30 submis-
sions filed during this period, only two have involved the
United States, and one of these two focused on Canadian as
well as U.S. actions in enforcing (or allegedly failing to ef-
fectively enforce) their treaty obligations under the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty.101 Even counting this submission,
which the Secretariat dismissed on the ground that it did not
involve an environmental law,102 the United States has only
been the focus of two of the past 30 submissions (or 6-7%).
Ten submissions have involved Canada (33%) (including
the Boundary Waters submission), while Mexico is the tar-
get of 19 of the last 30 submissions (more than 60%). In
short, the number of submissions involving the United
States has dropped precipitously both in an absolute sense
and relative to the numbers of submissions involving the
other parties.
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supra note 79. The totals above reflect the name of the member coun-
try listed as the “Party Concerned” in each submission.
104. The distribution of submissions also raises questions concerning the
possible influence of distributive justice-related issues, e.g., out-
come-based factors. That is, even if prospective submitters believe
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Table 3: Distribution of Submissions by Country 2001-2006 (Total Submissions 2001-2006)103
This substantial decline in U.S. submissions raises a host
of issues. For purposes of this Article, one key question in-
volves the extent to which citizen dissatisfaction with the
process for procedural justice reasons may have influenced
citizens virtually to abandon the process for the United
States.104 And, the obvious follow-up question: to the extent
that implementation of the process has been unsatisfactory
to citizens concerned about U.S. environmental enforce-
ment (and this may have motivated citizens to reduce use
of the process to challenge such enforcement), is it possi-
ble to identify features of the process that have been partic-
ularly problematic and to develop fixes that will amelio-
rate concerns?
Part V reviews some of the commentary concerning citi-
zen satisfaction with the process for possible insights re-
garding these questions. First, though, this Article lays the
groundwork for considering this question by reviewing the
psychology literature on satisfaction in order to provide a
tentative framework for considering citizen perspectives.
IV. An Overview of the Procedural Justice Literature
It is seemingly always worthwhile to try to increase under-
standing of ways in which government activities operate to
increase or diminish levels of citizen trust or confidence. As
discussed above,
105 numerous scholars have argued that
trust in government, and in institutions of governance, is in-
dispensable for the continuing legitimacy of the state. The
conventional wisdom—that, unfortunately, we are operat-
ing “against the backdrop of fifty years of declining legiti-
macy for legal and political authorities. People are less will-
ing to trust political and legal authorities than in the
past”106—increases the importance of such inquiries. This
part reviews a possible framework, which is drawn from the
social science literature on procedural justice for assessing
citizen satisfaction with institutions of governance, includ-
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that the process is “procedurally just,” they might not have much in-
terest in using it if the end result is not likely to be of value to them.
Thus, in considering the procedural justice implications of a mecha-
nism such as the CEC citizen submission process, it is also important
to keep in mind the possible salience to citizens of the issue of effec-
tiveness (outcomes). Suggesting the likely importance of distribu-
tive justice to citizen satisfaction, Professor Knox concludes that
“the utility of a reporting procedure [i.e., the CEC process] depends
on the value of the reports it produces.” Knox, supra note 92, at
381. Extrinsic factors also may have affected use of the process in-
cluding, for example, changes in priorities after September 11th,
availability of resources, availability of domestic mechanisms,
trust in government enforcement, or skepticism concerning the ef-
ficacy of “shaming” mechanisms in the current political climate.
See Graubart, supra note 82, at 137-40 (suggesting that changes in
the political climate have influenced use of the NAALC petition
process). A related point is that the lack of submissions involving
U.S. practices does not mean that U.S. NGOs have abandoned the
process. Of the 30 submissions filed since 2000, a few that focus on
Canadian or Mexican enforcement include U.S. individuals and/or
NGOs as co-submitters.
105. See supra notes 7-16 and 75 and accompanying text.
106. Tom R. Tyler et al., Social Justice in a Diverse Society 85
(1997).
107. As noted supra, citizen satisfaction is not the only factor that should
be considered in evaluating such processes. One leading commenta-
tor defines “procedural justice” as involving participants’ satisfac-
tion with decisionmaking processes. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Proce-
dural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
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ing government decisionmaking processes intended to pro-
mote meaningful public participation.107
The question of how best to evaluate decisionmaking pro-
cesses based on their “legitimacy” or capacity to increase
trust is not an easy one to answer.108 Intuitively, one might
think that outcomes of decisionmaking processes are the
variable most likely to influence perceptions of participants
and others about the legitimacy of such processes. It might
be expected, in other words, that results will be determina-
tive. To borrow from the psychology literature, because the
“instrumental orientation of social-psychological models of
the person . . . view[s] people as wanting to maximize the re-
sources they gain in interactions with others . . . ,”109 good re-
sults will engender increased confidence while adverse re-
sults will lead to diminished trust.
The psychology literature, however, suggests a result that
some have characterized as “counterintuitive,” notably that
the extent to which a process is procedurally just is ex-
tremely important to judgments about its legitimacy.110
While it may be “difficult to believe that people will find a
negative or undesirable outcome more acceptable simply
because of the manner in which it was arrived,”111 the psy-
chology literature on procedural justice suggests that is the
case. Akey insight from this literature, in short, is that legiti-
macy should not be assessed solely on the basis of the distri-
butional implications of decisionmaking processes, i.e.,
based on the fairness or justice of the outcomes different
types of processes are likely to yield. Instead, outcome
favorability and fairness are not identical—citizens clearly
make distinct fairness judgments—and the extent to which a
decisionmaking process is “procedurally just” is an impor-
tant factor in assessing the legitimacy of such process.112 As
Prof. Tom Tyler has put it, “the expanded model [of social
justice] recognizes that people are concerned about how de-
cisions are made as well as about what those decisions
are”—the distinction between procedural and substantive
justice.113 Evaluations of the fairness of the procedures by
which outcomes are determined have been labeled “judg-
ments of procedural justice.”114
John Thibaut and Laurens Walker undertook the first sys-
tematic psychological research program in the 1970s to try
to demonstrate the importance of procedural justice.115 They
hypothesized that a person’s evaluation of the fairness of
decisionmaking procedures influences the individual’s re-
action to the outcomes of those procedures that is distinct
from the person’s reaction to the outcomes themselves.116
Their studies demonstrated that peoples’ assessments of the
fairness of third-party decisionmaking procedures shape
their satisfaction with their outcomes.117 Subsequent studies
of procedural justice support Thibaut and Walker’s pioneer-
ing work, finding that participants’ level of satisfaction with
decisionmaking processes is “influenced by their judgments
about the fairness” of such processes.118 Professor Tyler,
one of the leading commentators in this area, summarizes
the literature in a 2000 article, Social Justice: Outcome
and Procedure:119
Studies of the legitimacy of authority suggest that people
decide how legitimate authorities are, and how much to
defer to those authorities and to their decisions, primar-
ily by assessing the fairness of their decisionmaking pro-
cedures. Hence, using fair decisionmaking procedures is
the key to developing, maintaining, and enhancing the
legitimacy of rules and authorities and gaining voluntary
deference to social rules.120
Professor Tyler suggests that procedural justice even may be
more important than distributive justice in some contexts in
shaping participants’ perspectives concerning the fairness
of decisionmaking processes, including in contexts in
which the “right” decision is unclear:
In many social situations, it is not at all clear what deci-
sion or action is correct in an objective sense. . . .
. . . .
Thibaut & Walker (1978) argue that what is critical to
good decisionmaking in outcome-ambiguous situations
is adherence to norms of fairness, and fairness is most
evident when procedures that are accepted as just are
used to generate the decision.121
Professor Tyler concludes that “there are important reasons
for optimism concerning the viability of justice-based strat-
egies for conflict resolution.”122 That is, decisionmaking
strategies that are procedurally just would seem to have sig-
nificant potential to ameliorate citizens’ distrust of govern-
ment, independent of the outcomes of such processes.123
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Legal Procedures, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 103, 121 (1988); see also
Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done With Equity Theory?
New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in
Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research 39
(Gerold Mikula ed., 1980) (indicating that “a justice rule is defined
as a belief that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy cer-
tain criteria. This type of justice rule is referred to as a procedural
rule, to distinguish it from distribution rules.”).
108. See supra note 7-16 and accompanying text.
109. Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 76.
110. See Tyler, supra note 107, at 108-10 (examining procedural justice
in the context of citizen experiences with police and courts).
111. See Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 76.
112. Tyler, supra note 107, at 117.
113. Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 75.
114. Id. at 76.
115. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66
Cal. L. Rev. 541 (1978) (proposing a general theory of procedure
for resolving conflicts, based on social psychology research examin-
ing characteristics of various systems in the legal process).
116. Id. at 548.
117. Id. at 549.
118. Tyler, supra note 107, at 103. Tyler went on to state:
Past studies have consistently found that judgments of the
fairness of the procedures that occur when citizens deal with
legal authorities influence citizen satisfaction and evaluation
of those authorities. . . .
. . . .
The findings . . . strongly support the suggestion of prior re-
search that a key determinant of citizen reactions to encoun-
ters with legal authorities is the respondents’ assessment of
the fairness of the procedures used in that contact.
Id. at 117, 128.
119. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 Int’l J.
Psychol. 117 (2000).
120. Id. at 120.
121. Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 100.
122. Tyler, supra note 119, at 124.
123. One interesting question that this finding raises involves the extent
to which “procedurally just” processes may operate as a placebo to
dampen citizens’ concerns about government decisions that citizens
should be concerned about. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell,
Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority:
The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke
L.J. 703 (1994) (questioning the value of procedures that create a
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In short, given government’s interest in increasing its le-
gitimacy with its citizens, it seems that government rou-
tinely would want to consider the procedural justice of its
decisionmaking processes. The next question involves
whether there are guideposts for evaluating the extent to
which decisionmaking processes are likely to be procedur-
ally just. To paraphrase Professor Tyler, assuming an an-
swer in the affirmative to the first issue—whether proce-
dural justice matters—the analysis then turns to the sec-
ond—the criteria that may be helpful in evaluating the fair-
ness of procedures.
Commentators have tended to focus on three key issues in
formulating frameworks for assessing the procedural justice
of different decisionmaking processes: (1) the criteria to be
used to evaluate fairness; (2) the weight to be given each cri-
terion; and (3) how the criteria are related.124 Further, com-
mentators have suggested that the answers to these ques-
tions are contextual rather than universal; that is, peoples’
perceptions of procedural justice “are found to vary depend-
ing on the nature of the situation.”125
Different scholars have posited different criteria for eval-
uating the procedural justice of decisionmaking pro-
cesses.126 Professor Tyler suggests that the following four
criteria are likely to be particularly important to individuals’
determinations about whether governmental procedures are
fair or just: (1) the nature of opportunities to participate127;
(2) whether the authorities are neutral128; (3) the degree to
which people trust the motives of the authorities129; and (4)
whether people are treated with dignity and respect during
the process.130
Part III of this Article demonstrates that prospective users
of the citizen submissions process have reduced their use of
the process in recent years to challenge the effectiveness of
U.S. environmental enforcement efforts. This part provides
a theoretical framework for considering possible reasons for
this decline, notably the possibility that prospective users
may be skeptical about the procedural justice of the pro-
cess.131 In the next part, I review the workings of the process
in order to explore the possibility that procedural justice
may be affecting citizen satisfaction.
V. Assessments of the Citizen Submissions Process in
Light of the Procedural Justice Literature
As noted in the preceding part, a central insight from the
procedural justice literature is that the views of prospective
submitters and others interested in the citizen submissions
process are likely to be based on procedural justice as well as
distributive justice considerations.132 As also noted in Part
IV, however, there is no consensus framework at this point
for assessing the extent to which any decisionmaking pro-
cess is likely to be procedurally just.133 In addition, there is a
recognition that what is procedurally just will vary with the
circumstances.134 The reader should keep these caveats and
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sense of fairness in cases in which those procedures do not materially
advance actual justice).
124. Tyler, supra note 107, at 106.
125. Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 92. See also Tyler, supra note 107,
123-24, 127 (suggesting that under differing circumstances citi-
zens judge procedural fairness by different criteria and therefore
there are no universally fair procedures for allocation and dispute
resolution; different procedures are appropriate in different cir-
cumstances); Leventhal, supra note 107, at 39-40 (suggesting that
the basic criteria used to evaluate the fairness of procedures change
with circumstances).
126. Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 87 (describing the different criteria
of commentators and recognizing that the framework for procedural
justice is evolving); Leventhal, supra note 107, at 39 (suggesting that
“[t]he criteria that define the rules of fair procedure can only be
guessed at this time, because there have been few studies of proce-
dural fairness”).
127. Tyler, supra note 119, at 121-22 (noting that where people may
participate in the resolution of their disputes or may voice their
opinions to decisionmakers, they view such a procedure as more
fair, even when their comments carry little weight in the outcome of
the conflict).
128. See id. at 122 (explaining people’s attribution of fairness to proce-
dures in which the authorities follow impartial rules and make de-
cisions based on objective factors, not personal feelings. “Ba-
sically, people seek a ‘level playing field’ in which no one is un-
fairly disadvantaged.”).
129. See id. (describing the importance of trust—based on the author-
ity’s thoughtful consideration of the arguments presented and ef-
forts to preserve fairness—in shaping people’s views of proce-
dural fairness).
130. See id. (pointing to the impact of the general desire to be treated with
dignity and respect on perceptions of fairness). For other formula-
tions, compare Leventhal, supra note 107, at 39 (listing six criteria
for procedural justice: (1) consistency; (2) the ability to suppress
bias; (3) decision quality or accuracy; (4) correctability; (5) repre-
sentation; and (6) ethicality); Thibaut & Walker, supra note 115, at
563-64 (highlighting process control and decision control as two pri-
mary criteria for evaluating procedural justice). Commentators have
noted that some of these considerations may trade off. For an exam-
ple, see Tyler et al., supra note 106, at 93-94 (noting the trade off
between fairness and nonfairness criteria, such as between providing
representation—a voice for participants—and efficiency).
131. Outcome-related (“distributive justice”) issues may be a factor as
well. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text. Of course, it
is possible that the explanation for the track record described in Part
II lies in whole or in part in developments external to the process it-
self. It may be, for example, that use has declined because concerns
about environmental enforcement are less salient than they used to
be, that priorities have shifted because of September 11th or other
developments, that resources have diminished, or that alternative
domestic processes to address NGO concerns have improved.
Randy Christensen has commented on the availability of domestic
mechanisms as a possible reason why a decline in submissions tar-
geting the United States has not been accompanied by a similar de-
cline in Canadian or Mexican submissions:
A common explanation given for the low usage of the citi-
zen submission process in the U.S. is the wide availability of
domestic enforcement mechanisms to pressure the govern-
ment to comply with environmental laws. These mecha-
nisms include avenues such as “citizen suit” provisions un-
der federal environmental law statutes that result in clear
and enforceable results. In Canada and Mexico, there are
significantly fewer domestic avenues available for achiev-
ing similar results.
Christensen, supra note 45, at 171.
Further, domestic expectations may be different as well, including
different expectations created by the relatively adversarial nature of
the U.S. legal system, and these differences may partially account
for differences in use and in reactions to the implementation experi-
ence. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based En-
forcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship, 24 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2000). Another possible explanation for the de-
cline is that “shifts in the broader political context [may have] af-
fected the value” of the CEC mechanism, as Professor Graubart
suggests has been the case for the NAALC. Graubart, supra note 82,
at 101.
132. See supra Part IV; see also supra note 131.
133. See supra Part IV.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. TRAC, supra note 23, at 40. The TRAC Report continues: “Cana-
dian and Mexican NGOs, however, have valued the increased trans-
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qualifications in mind in reviewing the effort in this part to
consider the citizen submissions process through the lens of
the procedural justice literature.
Applying Professor Tyler’s four criteria for assessing the
legitimacy of decisionmaking processes to the submissions
process (opportunities to participate, neutrality, trust, and
treatment with dignity and respect),135 the short answer is
that the literature suggests apparent shortcomings in the op-
eration of the process from a procedural justice standpoint.
Part of the blame may lie with the structure of the process,
while the actions of the governments of the three participat-
ing countries also appear to be responsible for some of the
dissatisfaction. The 2004 TRAC Report, for example, has
the following to say about the impact of Council actions on
U.S. NGO support for the CEC:
The CEC has less support than could have been antici-
pated among its major stakeholder groups (NGOs, busi-
ness, academia) in the United States for a variety of rea-
sons. The interest of US NGOs has declined. . . . US
NGO dissatisfaction with what they see as the Council
weakening the citizens’ submission process . . . has con-
tributed to this detachment.136
The TRAC Report continues: “while they [the parties] pub-
licly embrace the values that underlie the process—trans-
parency, accountability, stronger environmental protec-
tion—they have in practice sought to circumscribe it, for
reasons not well appreciated by outside observers.”137
In other words, according to several commentators, while
particular features of the process may be partially responsi-
ble for citizen frustration, the parties’ actions have under-
mined citizen satisfaction with the process in terms of
several elements of procedural justice that Professor Ty-
ler has identified.138
A. The Structure of the Process
The CEC citizen submissions process provides three main
opportunities for active citizen participation. First, the pro-
cess empowers citizens to launch the process by filing sub-
missions.139 Neither the CEC Secretariat nor the CEC Coun-
cil may initiate an investigation under the CEC citizen sub-
missions process; the capacity of either to act under the pro-
cess is predicated on a citizen filing a submission that identi-
fies alleged enforcement failures.140 Thus, the process al-
lows citizens to decide where to shine the CEC spotlight.
Common sense suggests that this opportunity to frame the
issues is an important element under the rubric of opportuni-
ties to participate.
Next, if the CEC Secretariat decides that a submission is
inadequate and dismisses it, a citizen may refile the submis-
sion within 30 days after receiving the dismissal.141 Further,
there is nothing to stop a citizen from filing a new submis-
sion if the Secretariat or Council decides not to develop a
factual record based on a citizen’s initial submission. Thus,
citizens are not subject to res judicata-type constraints on
filing submissions.142
Finally, interested citizens have a chance to submit infor-
mation to the CEC Secretariat if the CEC decides to develop
a factual record. Article 15(4) of the agreement authorizes
the Secretariat to consider “any relevant technical, scientific
or other information” that is “submitted by interested
non-governmental organizations or persons.”143 Thus, fol-
lowing their initiation of the process, citizens may contrib-
ute additional information for consideration as part of the
development of a factual record, if a submission makes it to
that point.
The process also limits citizens’ opportunities to partici-
pate. I discuss here three limitations that various commenta-
tors have criticized. First, if the CEC Secretariat determines
that a submission raises matters that deserve further consid-
eration, the Secretariat can request additional information
from the relevant Party and then determine whether to dis-
miss the submission or to recommend to the Council that a
factual record be developed.144 Some commentators have
urged that Submitters should have an opportunity to respond
to a Party’s response before the Secretariat makes its final
decision as to whether to recommend development of a fac-
tual record.145 In Lessons Learned, the JPAC recommended
that it would “improve public confidence in the
decisionmaking process” to allow submitters to submit a re-
sponse, particularly where “a Party’s response includes new
information not referred to in the original Submission.”146
Asecond limitation on citizen participation in the process
is that citizens have no opportunity to provide input during
the period that extends from a Secretariat Recommendation
to the Council that a factual record should be developed un-
til the Council issues its decision whether or not to proceed.
The JPAC and others have recommended that submitters
should have an opportunity, if a Party “chooses to submit
additional information directly to the Council in response to
such a recommendation from the Secretariat . . . to make a
brief written reply to such information so that the Council
can make a more fully informed decision on the Secretar-
iat’s recommendation.”147
To date, the Council has rejected these suggestions, stat-
ing that they would “lead to exchanges . . . that will result in a
more adversarial public submissions process which we do
not believe would benefit the process.”148
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parency that the citizens’ submission process has brought to specific
issues in each of these countries.” Id.
137. TRAC, supra note 23, at 42-43.
138. There are, of course, issues associated with the procedural justice of
the process that do not stem from the parties’ implementation of the
agreement. This part identifies some of these concerns as well. The
commentary suggests, however, that the Parties’ stances on a variety
of issues are among the more significant features of implementation
that have caused citizen dissatisfaction.
139. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14(1).
140. Id.
141. CEC, Bringing the Facts to Light: A Guide to Articles 14
and 15 of theNorthAmericanAgreement onEnvironmen-
tal Cooperation 14 (2000), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/SEM/BringingFacts-Jun02_en.pdf [hereinafter
Bringing the Facts to Light]. Any dismissal of a submission is
supposed to include an explanation of the reasons for the dismissal.
Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 59, at 6.1.
142. For an overview of res judicata, see, for example, Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §17 (1982).
143. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(4).
144. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 4.
145. Id. at 12.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id.
148. CEC, The JPAC at Ten: AReview of the Joint Public Advi-
sory Committee to the NorthAmerican Commission for En-
vironmental Cooperation 15 (2005) (quoting Letter from Coun-
cil (Mar. 6, 2002)).
149. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(5).
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A third limitation that citizens have identified in their op-
portunities to participate involves the Secretariat’s draft fac-
tual records. When the Council directs the Secretariat to pre-
pare a factual record, the Secretariat develops a draft factual
record, which it provides to the Council but is not authorized
to share with the submitters for their review or comment.149
Thus, while the Secretariat obtains and considers the
Parties’ comments on draft factual records before it devel-
ops a final factual record, NGOs are not allowed to see the
draft, let alone comment on it. As might be expected, the
NGO community has balked at this uneven playing field in
terms of its opportunities to participate.150
Because of these limitations on citizen participation,
Prof. Tseming Yang has argued that “[o]nce a submission
has been filed, the process is entirely controlled and man-
aged by the Secretariat and Council.”151 While, as noted
above, citizens do have the right to submit information as
part of the factual record process, Professor Yang’s perspec-
tive likely captures the larger point, notably that citizens
may have less confidence in the neutrality of the process
than they would otherwise because of these limits in oppor-
tunities to participate.
Two other limitations on citizen participation deserve at-
tention as well. First, the entire CEC process generally takes
place through submission and exchanges of written docu-
ments. While the process is underway, there is little, if any,
opportunity for citizens to engage the CEC decisionmakers
(the Secretariat or the Council); similarly, there is little, if
any, opportunity for citizens to engage the Party whose prac-
tices are at issue. Professor Freeman, among others, has ar-
gued that such interactions beyond the exchange of written
materials have value. She suggests that “collaborative gov-
ernance,” i.e., multistakeholder processes, are likely “to be
sites at which regulatory problems are redefined, innovative
solutions [are] devised, and institutional relationships [are]
rethought.”
152 Some citizens have complained that this limi-
tation reduces the value of citizen participation, and also
significantly reduces the utility of what they consider to be a
“cooperative” rather than an adversarial process.153 On the
other hand, one commentator has suggested that, despite
this general limitation to formal, written exchanges, the pro-
cess does enable or facilitate a dialogue, either in the con-
text of the process itself, or at a domestic level, noting that
the process:
[I]s most effectively utilized where submitters are en-
gaged in ongoing advocacy and wish to draw govern-
ment into “discussion” on issues as framed by the sub-
mitters, or where the submitters are seeking a mecha-
nism that will provide access to decision-makers or me-
dia. The citizen submission process also can assist in the
building of international coalitions by providing a clear
and visible effort that other organizations can support.154
Second, there is no support for citizens to participate in
the process. Domestic U.S. environmental laws often pro-
vide attorneys fees to citizens, at least under certain circum-
stances.155 Some laws also provide NGOs with funding to
enable them to hire technical support in order to facilitate
meaningful citizen participation.156 The CEC does not pro-
vide either. Features of the CEC process presumably reduce
the level of citizen investment compared to domestic litiga-
tion, although some commentators suggest that Council de-
cisions have made the process more difficult, time-consum-
ing, and expensive for submitters than was originally in-
tended.157 The CEC Secretariat is supposed to serve as the
neutral investigator of concerns that citizens raise (citizens
act primarily as pullers of the CEC “fire alarm,” calling the
Secretariat and Parties to action); this arguably limits the
need for extensive citizen submissions.158 Further, the CEC
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150. Two offsetting features of this process are: (1) the Parties’ comments
have ultimately become a matter of public record since the Secretar-
iat has included such comments as appendices in its final factual re-
cords, which are available to the public; and (2) the Parties’ com-
ments are supposed to be limited to raising issues concerning the
accuracy of the draft factual record, although that has not always
been the case. See, e.g., BC Aboriginal fisheries Commission et al.
(SEM-97-001) (May 30, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/BC-Hydr-Fact-record_en.pdf.
151. Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement’s Citizen Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y
Derivados, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 443, 478 (2005); cf. Jonathan
Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agree-
ments on Social Values: A Law-In-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s En-
vironmental Side Agreement, 6UCLA J. Int’l L. & ForeignAff.
425, 433 (2001) (suggesting that “each phase offers political oppor-
tunities for submitters to advance their underlying cause in terms of
receiving official legitimacy for their concern, forcing a response
form the government or advancing their issues on the governmen-
tal agenda”).
152. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45UCLAL.Rev. 1, 7 (1997). Professor Freeman invokes the
“republican principle [that] unanticipated or novel solutions are
likely to emerge from face-to-face deliberative engagement among
knowledgeable parties who would never otherwise share informa-
tion or devise solutions together.” Id. at 22-23.
153. See JPAC,Workshop on the History of Citizen Submissions
Pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 3 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/pdfs/sr-wrkshp-e.pdf
[hereinafter JPAC Workshop] (noting the views of Cliff Wallis
that submitters should be allowed to present their case orally). The
commission further notes the views of Herve Pageot that:
The Party and the submitters should meet in the event that
Council does not decide to proceed with the development of a
factual record. The idea is that the system should encourage
consensus, not provoke confrontation. In this way, submitter
could ascertain the reasons adduced by Council as well as the
positions of the other Parties.
Id. at 3. JPAC notes that the BC Hydro Factual Record process,
which included an opportunity for the key stakeholders to interact
with the experts the Secretariat retained to assist with the Factual Re-
cord, “incorporated procedures to improve public participation that
were not present in the Cozumel Pier Factual Record.” Lessons
Learned, supra note 23, at 5.
154. Christensen, supra note 45, at 183.
155. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1365(d), ELR Stat. FWPCA §505;RobertL.
Glicksman et al., 1037 n.8, Environmental Protection: Law
and Policy (5th ed. 2007).
156. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing measures states
have taken to encourage citizen participation, citing specifically ef-
forts in New York).
157. ELI, for example, suggests that the Council’s decision concerning
the Ontario Logging submission “appears to add to the existing
‘pleading’ requirements of the NAAEC a new and higher eviden-
tiary threshold for the sufficiency of information necessary to sup-
port allegations of non-enforcement.” IssuesRelating, supra note
23, at iv. ELI notes that doing so “potentially increases the financial
and human resources burdens placed on [submitters].” Id. It cites
some of the individuals it interviewed as arguing that “in setting the
bar for ‘sufficient information’ too high, the Council may render it
prohibitively difficult for citizens to participate in the process.” Id.
158. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Over-
sight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 165 (1984) (comparing congressional “police-patrol”
oversight with citizen “fire-alarm” oversight).
159. Raymond MacCallum, Evaluating the Citizen Submission Proce-
dure Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-
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process is less process-intensive than civil litigation in the
United States since there is no discovery or other pretrial
work of the sort that characterizes such practice.159 In sum,
while at least in theory the investment of citizens need not be
as great to bring a case before the CEC as would be the case
domestically, it is possible that barriers to participation and
lack of funding to help citizens overcome them affect citi-
zen satisfaction.160
In short, the procedural justice literature suggests that cit-
izens’ opportunities to participate in decisionmaking pro-
cesses affect their degree of satisfaction with such pro-
cesses. The CEC citizen submissions process affords citi-
zens significant opportunities to participate, but citizens
also have complained about some of the limitations in these
opportunities. This discussion is intended to identify some
of the positive aspects of opportunities to participate in the
CEC process as well as citizen concerns. Further systematic
inquiry will help to enhance understanding of citizens’ per-
spectives, e.g., concerning the weight citizens attach to the
lack of opportunity for in person interactions, and the weight
that citizens attach to the lack of funding mechanisms, and
the potential impact on citizen satisfaction of revamping the
CEC process in various ways.
B. Neutrality and Trust
There is a significant overlap in these criteria, at least in
terms of the CEC process, making joint treatment appropri-
ate. The CEC’s most recent commissioned report, the 2004
TRAC report, concludes that, in spite of various successes,
one of the “important concerns” that has emerged is that the
citizens’ submission process (“the NAAEC’s most innova-
tive public participation mechanism”) “has become mired in
controversy.”161 The TRAC report suggests that the Coun-
cil’s performance in particular has raised concerns about the
neutrality of the citizen submissions process and triggered a
decline in trust. The TRAC Report, for example, quotes a
submission from a team of legal advisors from the three
countries who advise the Secretariat on the citizen submis-
sions process that Council-imposed restrictions on the scope
of the process “ha[ve] the potential to permanently under-
mine the integrity of the process to the point where it is of
limited interest to potential submitters.”162 The legal advi-
sors highlighted the importance of public confidence in the
process and the dangers posed by a loss of such confidence:
“Process integrity and credibility are critical because it is a
public process that relies on and is driven by the responses
and actions of citizens and NGOs in the three countries.”163
In the rest of this part, I review the Council’s performance
and some of the commentary about the Council’s record.164
A superficial review of the Council’s and individual par-
ties’ track records in responding to individual submissions
suggests that citizens should have a high degree of trust in
the Council. The Parties’ first opportunity to participate in
the CEC process is to submit a response to a submission
when the CEC Secretariat requests one.165 To date, the coun-
tries have provided a formal, written response to each sub-
mission for which the Secretariat has requested one even
though they are not legally obligated to do so.166 Indeed,
many of these responses have been quite substantial.167 On
the other hand, skeptical citizens, particularly, might not
find much solace in the Parties’ having provided responses,
since in many of their responses the Parties have argued that
further investigation or information gathering (that is, de-
velopment of a factual record) is not appropriate.168 Instead,
in many responses the Party involved has urged the Secre-
tariat to dismiss the submission.169 Thus, if the Parties’posi-
tions at this stage had prevailed, the citizen submissions pro-
cess would have produced few factual records, despite its
operation for more than 10 years. My own intuitive sense is
that a substantively valuable response is likely to earn a
Party credibility with many submitters, even if the Party ul-
timately urges dismissal of the submission, but this question
deserves further investigation.
The first opportunity for the Council as a whole to partici-
pate in the CEC citizen submission process is its decision,
following receipt of a Secretariat recommendation to pre-
pare a factual record, whether to direct the Secretariat to
proceed with development of such a record170 or whether to
reject such a Recommendation and direct dismissal of the
submission.171 As of December 31, 2005, the Council has
authorized the Secretariat to prepare factual records for six-
teen submissions and it has directed the Secretariat to dis-
miss two submissions.172 Thus, in the vast majority of cases
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operation, 8 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 395, 421 (1997)
(noting that “the procedure potentially provides a means of private
participation in the promotion of enforcement, which avoids the ex-
pense of domestic legal proceedings”). Related to this, Secretariat
information-gathering efforts may obviate or diminish the need for
citizen Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which can be
time-consuming and expensive to pursue.
160. See TRAC, supra note 23, at 32.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 45 (citing Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director, Sub-
missions on Enforcement Matters Unit, to Jon Plaut, Chair, JPAC
(Feb. 15, 2002) (on file with author)).
163. Id. I explore these issues in more detail in Governance of Interna-
tional Institutions, supra note 21.
164. Other than citizen submitters and the Council, the CEC Secretariat is
the primary participants in the CEC citizen submissions process. As
I discuss elsewhere, external reviews of the citizen submissions pro-
cess generally have given the Secretariat high marks for its impar-
tiality and for the quality of the determinations issued. Markell, su-
pra, Understanding Citizen Perspectives.
165. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 14(2).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., U.S. Response, Great Lakes (SEM-98-003), C.E.C. Doc.
A14/SEM/98-003/RSP (Mar. 12, 1999), available at http://www.
cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-3-rsp-e.pdf. Other responses have con-
tained little information of value. Further, Mexico has asserted con-
fidentiality concerning at least part of several of its formal, written
responses, thereby preventing the public from reviewing them, de-
spite the NAAEC’s strong overall objective of promoting transpar-
ency and frequent statements by the Council supporting this objec-
tive. Markell, supra, Understanding Citizen Perspectives.
168. See, e.g., Canada Response, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc.
A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP (July 21, 1997), available at http://www.
cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-1-RSP-E.PDF; U.S. Response, Migratory
Birds (SEM-99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/99-002/04/RSP (Feb.
29, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.
PDF. This has not always been the case.
169. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 11-12.
170. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(2).
171. Id. art. 15(1).
172. Markell, supra, Understanding Citizen Perspectives.
173. See supra note 168.
174. See supra notes 58-68 (describing in more detail the Council’s pro-
cess for approving release of a final factual record).
175. NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 15(7).
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to come before it (88%), the Council has appeared to be re-
sponsive to citizen concerns and Secretariat judgments that
such concerns warrant more in-depth review and attention
from the citizen submissions process. Interestingly, this is
the case even though for many submissions for which the
Secretariat recommended that a factual record be devel-
oped,173 the Party whose enforcement practices were at is-
sue had initially urged dismissal of the submission. One
might reasonably conclude that citizens would be satisfied
with, and supportive of, the Council’s record at this first de-
cision point for it in the process.
The second Council decision point in the process in-
volves the decision whether to approve release of a final
factual record. As noted above, following the Secretar-
iat’s development of a draft factual record, the Secretariat
seeks comments from the Council concerning the accu-
racy of the draft, develops a final factual record, and sub-
mits this final record to the Council.174 It then is up to the
Council to decide, by two-thirds vote, whether to release
the factual record to the public.175 The Council has voted
unanimously to release the factual records that the Secre-
tariat has submitted.176
All in all, the Council’s record seems supportive of the
submissions process and would seem likely to engender
confidence that the Council is maintaining a neutral stance
in performing its role and has earned the trust of interested
parties. In particular, in the vast majority of cases (16 out of
18) the Council has endorsed the Secretariat’s recommenda-
tion that a factual record be developed.177 For each of the af-
firmative votes, the Council endorsement has been unani-
mous.178 Even the Party that has been the subject of the sub-
mission has voted to pursue a factual record.179 The fact that
for several submissions the targeted Party on its own viewed
the submission to be unworthy of further review under the
process, and then later acceded to such further review,180 ar-
guably also lends support for the notion that the parties are
able, when acting as the Council, to put aside any parochial
perspective that otherwise might be ascribed to them and
operate as custodians of the process. Bolstering the seem-
ingly positive nature of this Council track record is the fact
that the Council has unanimously approved the release of fi-
nal factual records.
Nevertheless, there are abundant signs in the commentary
about the process that citizens do not trust the Council or the
individual Parties, and that citizens lack confidence in the
neutrality of any of the government actors. The sense one
gets is that the submitter (and prospective submitter) com-
munity views the Council to be distinctly unenthusiastic
about the process. There is considerable evidence that sub-
mitters consider the Council to be extremely reluctant to ful-
fill its minimum responsibilities and, in many cases, as affir-
matively undermining the process.
The Council has taken at least five types of actions that
appear to have sowed distrust and a sense of lack of neutral-
ity.181 First, critics have criticized the Council for purport-
edly overstepping its authority, and intruding on or usurping
the responsibilities and authority of the CEC Secretariat. As
suggested above,182 the Parties have not retained plenary au-
thority to make the decisions required under the citizen sub-
missions process. Instead, they have given the Secretariat
certain responsibilities and a significant degree of inde-
pendence in the implementation of the process, while also
giving submitters certain powers as well (notably, for our
purposes, the power to launch the process and thereby iden-
tify the alleged failures to effectively enforce that should re-
ceive detailed scrutiny). As I also have suggested elsewhere,
the question of boundaries of authority has arisen several
times during the early years of the process.183 A common
theme of the NGO community and of scholarly and other
commentary is that, for the process to operate as intended
(and for it to be credible with civil society), the Parties need
to do a better job of adhering to the self-imposed limits con-
tained in the NAAEC and, relatedly, to accord appropriate
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER37 ELR 10380 5-2007
176. See CEC’s website. CEC, Who We Are/Council, http://cec.org/who_
we_are/council/resolutions/index.cfm?varlan=English (last visited
Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Who We Are] (providing Council resolu-
tions from 1994 through the present).
177. See supra tbl. 6.
178. See Who We Are, supra note 176.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Submission, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc.
A14/SEM/97-001/01/SUB* (Apr. 2, 1997), available at http://
www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF756.pdf. In its response, Canada
urged that a factual record was not appropriate. Canada Response,
BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP
(July 21, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-
1-RSP-E.PDF. But in Council Resolution 98-07 Canada joined the
United States and Mexico in voting to develop a factual record.
Council Res. 98-07, 1, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/98-00/RES/03/Rev.3
(June 24, 1998).
181. I have not tried to include every nuance in the process that raises pro-
cedural justice concerns. Instead, I have focused on what appear to
be among the more significant concerns. Other Council actions have
triggered procedural justice concerns as well. For example, the
TRAC Report identifies other complaints submitters have made of
the Parties, such as not providing information that the Secretariat has
requested, delaying the process, and attempting to pre-empt CEC re-
view through “desultory enforcement actions. . . .” TRAC, supra
note 23, at 46. The TRAC Report similarly found that “[m]any ob-
servers” perceived the Council’s four November 2001 Resolutions
as “contradicting” a 2000 Council Resolution that implied that the
Council would ask JPAC to “review changes to the process before
they were introduced.” Id. at 44. Randy Christiansen indicated that
the BC Hydro submitters “alleged that the process was compromised
by non-cooperation and political interference by the Government of
Canada, resulting in a less valuable factual record than was possi-
ble.” Christensen, supra note 45, at 175. Wold identified three “prin-
cipal means” in which the Council has, in his view, undermined
the process:
The Council has adversely affected the ability of the Citizen
Submission Process to achieve better environmental results.
The Council has degraded the process through three principal
means: (1) disallowing examinations of allegations of a
broad pattern of ineffective enforcement, (2) limiting the
scope of factual records and (3) questioning the sufficiency
of information.
Wold et al., supra note 44, at 423.
182. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
183. Governance of International Institutions, supra note 21, at 762-80.
Some early commentators anticipated these tensions. See, e.g.,
Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 23, at 131-69 (charting creation
and the structural conflicts inherent in the NAAEC); Four-Year
Review, supra note 23 (describing division of responsibilities and
noting the separation of authority). Numerous observers have com-
mented on the presence of such tensions. See, e.g., Christopher
Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen
Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 141,
175 (2001) (noting tension surrounding the submissions procedure).
See generally Knox, supra note 60; Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper
Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the
Cozumel Reef Case, 39 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 395 (2001).
184. See, e.g.,CEC,Advice toCouncilNo: 01-07 (2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/01-07E.pdf.
185. TRAC, supra note 23, at 32.
186. Id. at 45.
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respect to the Secretariat’s integral role in the process.184
The 2004 TRAC Report notes that “if many have criticized
the Council for not providing sufficient overall direction to
the Secretariat’s environmental cooperation program, they
have also expressed concern about the Council exercizing
[sic] too much direction on the administration of Articles
14/15 where the Secretariat has specific responsibilities un-
der the NAAEC.”185 It reports that interested stakeholders
have argued that “the Council has exceeded its legal author-
ity by making decisions that the NAAEC assigns to the Sec-
retariat . . . .186 The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) simi-
larly concluded that the Council has not sufficiently re-
spected the independence of the Secretariat.187
One example of this criticism of Council over-reaching
involves the Council’s decision, in issuing four Resolutions
in November 2001 that authorized the Secretariat to develop
factual records, as the Secretariat had recommended, to
change the focus of the factual records sought by submit-
ters.188 While these submissions alleged widespread failures
to enforce,189 supported by the Secretariat’s Recommenda-
tions to develop factual records of a scope broad enough to
explore such alleged failures, the Council’s Resolutions di-
rected the Secretariat to only develop factual records con-
cerning the specific examples of failures to enforce effec-
tively asserted by the submitters.190 AFebruary 2002 memo-
randum from the director of the CEC Secretariat’s submis-
sions unit to the chair of the JPAC makes this clear:
[T]he Council included instructions [in the four Resolu-
tions] to prepare factual records regarding specific cases
raised in the submissions, but did not include instruc-
tions regarding allegations in each of those submissions
of widespread failures to effectively enforce environ-
mental laws. For each of those four submissions, the Sec-
retariat had recommended preparing factual records in
regard to the widespread allegations of failures to effec-
tively enforce.191
In its review of the Council’s actions, ELI concluded that
“[p]ersuasive textual arguments can be and have been made
to suggest that the Council’s resolutions were not within
the scope of authority granted to it under the NAAEC.”192
ELI continued by stating that the Council’s actions also
“appear to violate the object and purpose, or ‘spirit,’ of the
Agreement, the fundamental objectives of which include
the enhancement of transparency and public participation
in environmental decisionmaking.”193 ELI concluded that
“[m]any commentators expressed the view that, by inter-
vening in the fact-finding process, the Council [was] un-
dermining the independence of the Secretariat and the
credibility of the process.”194
The Council’s actions may have contributed to a loss
of citizen trust in the citizen submissions process or in
the Council, and thereby may have potentially contrib-
uted to a decline in use of the process. As the TRAC re-
port concludes:
There is an argument to be made that the process could
generate more environmental benefits if the Council
sought to restrict it less. Some observers have argued, for
example, that the actions of the Council have eroded the
credibility of the process and are directly responsible for
the fact that no new submissions have been brought
against the United States Government in the last four
years and that large environmental NGOs are not using
the process.195
A second criticism is that the Council has taken actions
that have circumscribed the scope of the CEC process and
thereby limited its utility. The TRAC Report notes that
“[t]he Council has adopted a series of measures over the
years to narrow the process’s scope.”196 It also notes that the
“JPAC, the NACs, the US GAC, academics, independent
observers and NGOs have widely and repeatedly criticized
the Council for these actions.”197
Citizens and others have criticized the four November
2001 Council Resolutions discussed above as an example of
Council actions that have sought to narrow the scope of the
process and the types of enforcement failures that it may ad-
dress. In an October 2003 report to the JPAC concerning
these four Resolutions, ELI concluded that
[T]he Council jeopardized the ability of those [factual]
records to fully expose the controversy at issue. Spe-
NEWS & ANALYSIS5-2007 37 ELR 10381
187. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at 23-24 (providing opposing
views on the authority of the Council); see also id. at iii (noting that
to be effective, the Secretariat “needs to maintain its independence as
a neutral investigative body in order to ensure public trust in the [citi-
zen submissions] process”).
188. Council Res. 01-10, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/03/FINAL
(Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/
COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf; Council Res. 01-10, C.E.C. Doc.
C/C.01/01-06/RES/01/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://
www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-09e.pdf; Council Res.
01-10, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/04/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-10e.
pdf; Council Res. 01-11, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/FINAL
(Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/
COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf.
189. Alliance for the Wild Rockies et al., Submission to the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to
Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation (SEM 99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM-99-
002/01/SUB (1999), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/
99-2-SUB-E.pdf (alleging failure to enforce effectively the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act in the United States).
190. See supra note 184.
191. Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director, Submissions on En-
forcement Matters Unit, requesting information on issues in JPAC
Advice to Council 01-09, 2 (Feb. 15, 2002), available at http://www.
cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/Memo-garver-e.pdf. ELI has reached this
conclusion as well, noting that the Council “significantly narrowed
the scope of the investigation” in each of its resolutions. Issues Re-
lating, supra note 23, at iii, 5, noting, for example, that:
[a]lthough the Council approved the preparation of factual
records with respect to each of these submissions, it signifi-
cantly narrowed the scope of the investigation. That is, rather
than order the preparation of factual records on the alleged
widespread failure to effectively enforce, it instructed the
Secretariat to develop factual records concerning only spe-
cific examples of the alleged widespread failure that were de-
tailed in the submission.
Id. at 5-6. As might be expected, NGOs, including several submit-
ters, have articulated this view and criticized the Council for its ac-
tions. Governance of International Institutions, supra note 21, at
781-93.
192. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at vi.
193. Id.
194. Id. at v.
195. TRAC, supra note 23, at 46.
196. Id. at 44.
197. Id. at 45.
198. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at v.
199. Id. at 6-12, 13, 27; Kibel, supra note 183, at 416-71; Christensen, su-
pra note 45, at 178-80.
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cifically, the factual records were not able to address evi-
dence of widespread enforcement failures, cumulative
effects that stem from such widespread patterns, or the
broader concerns of submitters about implementation of
enforcement policies.198
The Secretariat, as well as outside observers such as ELI,
have highlighted specific ways in which the Resolutions
changed (and limited) the types of information the Secretar-
iat developed compared to the types of information it would
have developed had the Resolutions endorsed the submis-
sions and Recommendations.199 Wold, among others, has
claimed that the Council Resolutions, in rejecting
broad-based factual records that focus on alleged wide-
spread enforcement failures, significantly reduced the
value of the citizen submissions process because, at least in
the United States, it is those types of enforcement failures
that citizens have limited ability to address through domes-
tic mechanisms:
Submitters quickly recognized that the process was es-
pecially useful when examining a broader pattern of
government conduct which, if not adequately justified or
explained, might reveal a systematic failure to enforce
environmental law. This is especially true in the United
States where the [U.S.] Supreme Court has ruled that an
agency’s decision not to take enforcement action with re-
spect to a specific case is “presumed immune from judi-
cial review.” [Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985).]200
In a recent article, Wold says explicitly:
Without question, the submitters would never have pre-
pared Migratory Birds if they had known that the Coun-
cil would, in an arbitrary and unexplained fashion, limit
the record to two specific instances cited only as exam-
ples of widespread government nonenforcement.201
He indicates that “[t]he Migratory Birds submitters found
the Citizen Submission Process attractive only because of its
capacity to investigate the U.S. broad pattern of
nonenforcement of the MBTA.”202 His conclusion about the
results of the Council’s narrowing the scope of the factual
record in connection with the submission he prepared sug-
gests that this narrowing has likely not improved citizens’
current perceptions of the value of the process:
The absurdity of the result is patent: the Council directed
the Secretariat to develop a factual record in Migratory
Birds that resembled neither the issues presented by
the submitters nor those recommended for study by
the Secretariat. Indeed, it is the factual record that no-
body wanted.203
Third, the Council has been criticized for failing ade-
quately to explain its decisions, particularly when it rejects
Secretariat Recommendations to prepare factual records.204
The Council, in the first Resolution that rejected a Secretar-
iat Recommendation to prepare a factual record, provided
no explanation at all for the Council’s decision.205 John
Knox noted that the Council “simply denied the develop-
ment of a factual record without further explanation,” and
charged that “such a decision runs counter to the entire con-
ception of NACEC and NAAEC.”206
In response to citizen criticism, in 2001 the Council
agreed to explain its rationale for dismissing submissions
for which the Secretariat had recommended development of
a factual record,207 but the explanations the Council has pro-
vided to date have been of limited utility.
It is likely that the JPAC, in Lessons Learned, has cap-
tured the public’s view of this state of affairs, notably that
the Council should provide reasoned explanations for its de-
cisions, just as is expected of the Secretariat:
The articles 14 and 15 process should . . . be character-
ized by decisionmaking that is open, informed and rea-
soned. The current Guidelines require the Secretariat
staff to indicate its reasons for a decision under Article
15(1) to recommend a factual record and at certain other
decisionmaking points within the Article 14(1) and (2)
reviews. These requirements provide the Parties, the
Council and the public with the requisite confidence
that the review is being conducted both openly and on a
reasoned basis. For this reason, similar considerations
should govern any Council decision not to accept the
Secretariat’s recommendation to develop a factual re-
cord. The obligation to state substantive reasons for im-
portant governmental decisions affecting the environ-
ment should not be seen as an unreasonable burden,
particularly where the Secretariat has, after investiga-
tion, indicated its reasons for recommending such a fac-
tual record.208
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203. Id. at 427. Randy Christensen offers a similar view on this issue:
Unfortunately, initial predictions that the mechanism was
vulnerable to political manipulation have proven accurate
over 10 years. Council actions have prevented a fulsome in-
vestigation of allegations of enforcement failure in many
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and Mexican governments, . . . it is not surprising that Parties
have used their powers to influence the process.
Christensen, supra note 45, at 180-81.
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Bulas Montoro, Alternate Representative for Mexico, Council of the
CEC, to Donna Tingley, 2004 Chair, JPAC, CEC (Jun. 3, 2004) (on
file with author). The Council also addresses the “sufficiency of in-
formation” issue in this letter. Id.
205. Council Res. 00-01, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/00-04/RES/0/Rev.03 (May
16, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/
res01r3e_EN.pdf.
206. See JPACWorkshop, supra note 153, at 4 (reporting a paraphras-
ing of all participants’ comments). Knox commented that Council
should explain in all cases why it adopted a Resolution on whether or
not to develop a factual record. Id. Knox pointed out that this did not
occur in the Quebec Hog Farm case. Id.
207. Council Res. 01-06, 2, C.E.C. Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev.4 (June
29, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Res-
06r4_EN.pdf.
208. LessonsLearned, supra note 23, at 15-16. Also related to the issue
of reasoned explanations, the Council has been characterized as op-
posing allowing the Secretariat to reach formal conclusions, or to
make Recommendations, regarding allegations of a failure to effec-
tively enforce, and several commentators have criticized this aspect
of the process. JPAC Workshop, supra note 153, at 7-8. Knox’s
comments were summarized as contending that
[E]ven though NAAEC does not explicitly prohibit factual
records from containing conclusion or recommendations,
that is a point that JPAC should not support, since the Parties
are convinced that the purpose of factual records is not to
reach conclusions of law. . . . [Knox] felt the battle is not
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Fourth, the Council has taken actions that citizens have
complained make it more difficult for them to use the pro-
cess effectively.209 The 2004 TRAC report suggests that
Council actions “may make it prohibitively difficult for citi-
zens to file submissions.”210 Similarly, in its 2003 report ELI
indicates that the Council has increased the burden on sub-
mitters—that the increased level of specificity required
means that concerned citizens groups must expend more re-
sources and money to research exact violations rather than
relying on “evidence of widespread, systemic failures to en-
force” environmental laws.211 As the JPAC put it in a 2003
memo, “[d]efining the scope of factual records to require
citizens’ groups to detail every specific violation to be in-
cluded in the Secretariat’s investigations potentially in-
creases the financial and human resources burdens placed
on these groups.”212
Finally, there is the issue of confidentiality. Despite the
emphasis the NAAEC gives to increasing transparency and
accountability,213 the Council has on occasion taken actions
that reduce transparency and these actions have triggered
complaints from citizens. For example, in 1999 the Council
acted to preclude the Secretariat from making public its rec-
ommendation to the Council to develop a factual record un-
til 30 days had passed.214 In Lessons Learned, the JPAC
summarized citizen sentiment on this Council-imposed lim-
itation on transparency as follows:
The commentators spoke virtually as one against the re-
quirements that a Secretariat recommendation to the
Council . . . be withheld from the public for 30 days af-
ter its submission to the Council. It was widely agreed
that there is “no need” for the requirement, that “it
should be eliminated,” that it is impractical, and that it
does not stand up to serious analysis, and that, in gen-
eral, it seriously undermines the purpose of the Arti-
cles 14 and 15 process.215
It was only after citizen complaints about this directive that
the Council revised it to allow the Secretariat to make its
Recommendations available to the public (in addition to
providing them to the Council) in a more timely manner.216
Also on the issue of confidentiality, in Lessons Learned,
the JPAC reported that “[s]everal commentators expressed
concern regarding what they perceived as an increase in par-
ties’ reliance on the confidentiality provisions of [the
NAAEC].”217 The JPAC itself expressed the view that
[A] Party’s right to invoke that [the confidential infor-
mation] defense against disclosure should be narrowly
construed and should be limited to those circumstances
in which it is expressly authorized by [the NAAEC]. . . .
Anything broader than that . . . will serve principally to
dilute the effectiveness of a procedure that relies on pub-
lic disclosure and scrutiny for its credibility and accep-
tance. If a Party invokes the privacy defense, it should
state the reasons and the provisions it relies on.218
I close this part with a quotation from an article by Wold,
the attorney whose submission led to the only factual record
concerning U.S. enforcement practices. Wold notes:
[E]arly support [for the process] . . . has waned consider-
ably as the decisions of the CEC’s Council . . . have
eroded public confidence in the process. The Council
has marginalized the Secretariat’s independence by
narrowing the scope of submissions, a role designated
to the Secretariat. In addition, it has ignored the JPAC’s
advice on implementation of the submission process.
Moreover, the member governments have chosen to
treat the Citizen Submission process as adversarial,
rather than cooperative. . . .
. . . .
The Council . . . [has] seriously inhibited the Citizen
Submission Process from achieving more positive envi-
ronmental results and deeply undermined the Secretariat
and the JPAC. Consequently, support for the Citizen
Submission Process in the United States is very low.219
Wold concludes:
Environmental groups who have supported the develop-
ment and implementation of the Citizen Submission
Process are growing increasingly frustrated over the
Council’s unwillingness to respect the boundaries estab-
lished in the process. If this perception continues, many
of the groups who have supported and defended the Citi-
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worth fighting, since the Parties will most certainly put up
a resistance.
Id.; Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 13. Stating that:
[M]any commentators believed that factual records should be
able to reach conclusions . . . as to a Party’s “effective en-
forcement of its environmental law” . . . and should also in-
clude recommendations for further action by a Party to im-
pose the effectiveness of such enforcement. Other, how-
ever, believed that JPAC should not support such an ap-
proach since the Parties believe that the purpose of factual
records is not to reach “conclusions of law” and will resist
these proposals.
Id. These concerns seemingly raise distributive as well as procedural
justice concerns.
209. JPAC Workshop, supra note 153, at 5.
210. TRAC, supra note 23, at 45.
211. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at 19. A similar complaint is that
“[t]he Council’s resolutions appear to require submitters to allege
specific violations in order to support the development of a factual
record.” Id. at 19.
212. CEC, Advice to Council No: 03-05, at 2 (2003), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/Advice03-05_EN.pdf.
213. See, e.g., NAAEC, supra note 22, art. 1(h) (identifying transparency
as one of the goals); Yang, supra note 151, at 444 (indicating that
transparency is the “major goal” of the process). The Council itself
frequently touts its commitment to transparency and the importance
the NAAEC gives to transparency as an objective. See, e.g., Council
Res. 99-06, C.E.C. Doc. C/99-00-07/Rev.3 (June 28, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06e_EN.pdf
(noting the importance of transparency and fairness in the citizen
submissions process); Council Res. 00-09, C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/
RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf (similarly recognizing the
importance of transparency in the citizen submissions process).
214. See Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 59, at 10.2 (direct-
ing the Secretariat to notify the public that the Secretariat had
made a Recommendation 30 days after the Secretariat submitted
the Recommendation).
215. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 10. JPAC itself formally
recommended that the “current 30-day ‘blackout’ period should
either be abolished or substantially reduced.” Id. at 16; see also
JPAC Workshop, supra note 153, at 4 (suggesting that the
30-day delay is “nonsensical, impractical and does not stand up
to serious analysis”).
216. Council Res. 01-06, supra note 207, at 1-2.
217. Lessons Learned, supra note 23, at 11.
218. Id. at 17; see also Yang, supra note 151, at 454, 475-76.
219. Wold et al., supra note 44, at 417-18. The Council has responded to
some of these criticisms. See e.g., Montoro, supra note 204.
220. Wold et al., supra note 44, at 443-44.
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zen Submission Process may simply abandon the pro-
cess and declare it, and the CEC, inappropriately tailored
to meet the challenges of environmental enforcement.
The Council certainly knows what it must do to restore
public confidence in the process and to ensure its effec-
tiveness. It must release its grip on the process and em-
brace the NAAEC’s cooperative spirit. The question is
whether it has the political will to do so.220
VI. Conclusion
Much recent scholarship has supported increasing citizen
participation in governance, and there has been consider-
able activity to encourage greater citizen involvement in
various stages of governance. The creation of the CEC citi-
zen submissions process in the mid-1990s is one example of
this phenomenon. As ELI put it in its 2003 report, “[a] fun-
damental objective of the [NAAEC] is to enhance public
participation in environmental decision-making. By far the
most innovative and substantial mechanism [in the
NAAEC] . . . for fostering these goals is the citizen submis-
sions process. . . .”221
For those interested in promoting more citizen engage-
ment, a key question involves how to structure decision-
making processes to produce this result. This Article sug-
gests that the psychology literature on procedural justice
offers one framework for thinking about how mechanisms
intended to encourage citizen involvement should be
structured. This literature seeks to advance understanding
of the types of process features that are likely to yield high
levels of participant satisfaction, and the types of features
that are not.
My effort in this Article to explore the CEC citizen sub-
missions process through the lens of the procedural justice
literature suggests the possible relevance of procedural jus-
tice to the level of citizen use of that process in the United
States. Systematic work is needed to confirm or rebut the
sense of the commentary about the CEC process that I have
outlined. Empirical work would be helpful, for example, to
confirm (or not) the sentiments expressed in the commen-
tary concerning possible reasons why citizen satisfaction
with the process appears to be limited and to have declined
in recent years, at least with regard to submissions involving
the United States. Related, there would seem to be consider-
able potential value in exploring systematically why sub-
missions concerning Canada and Mexico have not experi-
enced similar declines. Future empirical work concerning
the CEC citizen submission mechanism might focus on at
least three questions that in particular seem well worth ex-
ploring: (1) what features of the process are of greatest im-
portance or salience to citizens from a procedural justice
perspective; (2) what is the importance to citizens of proce-
dural justice vis-à-vis distributive justice concerns; and (3)
how relevant are extrinsic factors (such as culture, the avail-
ability of alternative mechanisms, etc.) to citizens’ interest
in using the process.222
The larger purpose of the Article is to suggest the impor-
tance of systematic analysis of process design as part of the
policymaking enterprise.223 The yield from this effort,
hopefully, will ultimately be to motivate creation of gov-
ernment decisionmaking processes that embody the les-
sons learned from such work and hopefully prove more ef-
fective than current approaches in enhancing citizen confi-
dence in governance.
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221. Issues Relating, supra note 23, at v.
222. Randy Christensen, a principal Canadian submitter, echoes Wold’s
concerns, which are summarized in the text: “The repeated attempts
by Council to influence the handling of specific submissions have
not only impeded the operation of the spotlight, but have also under-
mined public confidence in the process.” Christensen, supra note 45,
at 184-85. But his perspective on future use of the process in Canada
also suggests the likely relevance of nonprocedural justice factors to
the level of citizen use: “Despite these deficiencies, it is likely that
the environmental groups will continue to use the mechanism in at-
tempts to deal with non-enforcement issues within Canada, as there
are few domestic alternatives.” Id.
223. Gibson et al., supra note 7, at 538, 555 (noting that “we have a long
way to go in understanding the relationship between institutional
performance and legitimacy” and that “only with more valid mea-
sures of institutional legitimacy can we make progress in unraveling
the causal linkages between performance and legitimacy”).
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